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iForew ord
This research study has been produced by a team o f researchers from the Economics and Resource Analysis
(ERA) Unit o f the Ho me O ffice (part o f the Research, Develo pment and Statistics Directo rate) with the
assistance o f the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) o f the Cabinet O ffice. It aims to  pull together the
existing theory and evidence on the economic and social impacts o f migration. The work has pulled together
existing evidence in the UK and abroad, and has invo lved some new analysis o f existing data, including the
Labour Force Survey, to  identify particular characteristics and labour market outcomes for the current migrant
population. The work has also  benefited from discussions with a number o f experts in the migration field in
academia and elsewhere.
O ne o f the seven aims o f the Ho me O ffice is the “ regulatio n o f entry to , and settlement in, the United
Kingdom in the interests o f social stability and economic growth; the facilitation o f travel by UK citizens; the
support o f destitute asylum seekers during consideration o f their claims; and the integration o f those accepted
as refugees” . A fundamental requirement in delivering this aim is a sound understanding o f the impacts o f
existing po licies affecting migration and migrants, and a framework for assessing the costs and benefits o f
potential alternatives. This is all the more important against the background o f recent increases in migration to
the UK and the globalisation o f labour markets’  with employers increasingly seeking to  fill labour shortages
from overseas and workers increasingly able to  travel to  meet demand.
This study represents a major attempt to  identify the overall economic and social outcomes o f migration po licy
in the UK, both in theory and in practice. The evidence indicates that, whilst migrants constitute a very diverse
set o f people with different characteristics contributing in different ways to  the UK economy and society,
overall migration has the potential to  deliver significant economic benefits. It also  makes clear that the issues
are complex, and the data incomplete. O ne o f the primary purposes o f producing this research study is to
encourage debate and further serious research on how migration po licy might be further developed in order
to  achieve the G overnment’s objective, to  maximise the benefits o f migration.
Paul W iles, 
Director Research Development and Statistics Directorate, 
Home O ffice
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Migration: an economic and social analysis
Ex ecutive summary
1 . This document has been prepared by the Home O ffice Economics and Resource Analysis Unit with
assistance fro m the Perfo rmance and Inno vatio n Unit in the Cabinet O ffice. It attempts to  lo o k at
migration in the round: beginning with theory and background trends, proceeding to  a discussion o f the
current po licy framework in the context o f the G overnment’s high level objectives, and examining the
economic and social outcomes which current po licy delivers and their contribution to  those objectives. It
concludes with suggestions fo r further research and analysis that will help to  underpin future po licy
development in this area.
2 . This study is for discussion purposes only and does not constitute a statement o f G overnment po licy. In
particular, this study is intended to  be the start o f a  pro cess o f further research and debate – by
identifying both what we know from existing data sources and analysis, and where further analysis is
required. There is a real need for more research in this area – indeed, it is striking how little research on
migration there has been in the UK.
3 . Chapter 1  sets out the background to  the study. There is an emerging debate, in both the UK and the
rest o f the EU, about the need for a new analytical framework for thinking about migration po licy. 
4 . Chapter 2  discusses the economic theory o f migration. This is similar to  the theory o f trade, but migration
is a much more complex phenomenon than trade. Like trade, migration is likely to  enhance economic
growth and the welfare o f both natives and migrants; and restrictions on migration are likely to  have
economic costs. However, people move for a variety o f reasons, by no  means all economic. There are
significant externalities – both social and economic – to  migration. Moreover, migration is not a one-way,
one-o ff process. We conclude this chapter by looking at the empirical evidence: while far from definitive,
it appears to  support the conclusion that migration has tended to  promote economic growth.
5 . Chapter 3  argues that the conventional picture o f UK post-war migration was never the whole truth; and
is inadequate to  describe current realities. Migration to  the UK has recently increased. This rise appears
to  be largely driven by economic forces, and is occurring across all categories o f migrants, from people
entering with work permits to  asylum seekers. It reflects a number o f factors:
● the current strength o f the UK labour market
● economic globalisation
● increasing economic integration and labour mobility within the EU
● increased po litical instability around the world.
6 . All but the first are related to  g lo balisatio n; and are therefo re no t likely to  reverse. Migratio n may
therefore be on a secular upward trend. Indeed, over the medium to  longer term, migration pressures
will intensify across Europe as a whole as a result o f demographic changes.
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7 . Chapter 4  outlines the G overnment’s aim and objectives fo r migration po licy, fo cusing on the Home
O ffice ’s aim to  regulate migration to  the UK in the interests o f social stability and economic growth. This is
put in the context o f the Government’s wider aims and objectives and relevant departmental objectives.
8 . Chapter 5  summarises the current immigration system. It views migration po licy as a continuum, running
from entry contro ls to  settlement to  integration; thus, it covers not only entry contro l and settlement po licy,
but a lso  reviews o ther po lic ies that the po st-entry integ ratio n o f mig rants into  UK eco no my and 
society impacts upon.
9 . Chapter 6  then analyses the economic and social outcomes o f po licy, both for the migrants themselves
and for the UK as a whole. The principal findings are the fo llowing:
● Migrants are  ve ry he te rogeneous, differing at least as much from each o ther as they differ
from the general population. In particular, migrant experiences are more po larised than those
for the population as a whole with larger concentrations at the extremes (e.g . o f wealth and
poverty, high and low skills, etc.).
● Migrants have  mixed success in the  labour marke t; some migrants are very successful, but
others are unemployed or inactive. Migrants have higher average incomes than natives, but
this average masks the po larisation o f experiences, with migrants over-represented at the top
o f the inco me distributio n but also  highly co ncentrated at the lo wer end o f the inco me
distribution, and experience lower activity rates. Key correlates o f success include method o f
entry to  the UK (and the requirements and restrictions placed upon them), education and
English language fluency, which interact in co mplex ways. Impo rtant barriers to  migrant
labour market success are lack o f general knowledge about the UK labour market; restrictions
o n access to  emplo yment;  and lack o f reco g nitio n o f qualificatio ns and/ o r access to
certification/ re-certification.
● W here  migrants se ttle  is like ly to  be  a complex decision, and is one we know relatively little
about. Migrants are highly concentrated – and increasingly so  – in London, reflecting the size
o f the Lo ndo n labo ur market and the well-do cumented unmet labo ur demand in Lo ndo n.
W ithin London, migrants are concentrated in areas o f both relative prosperity and relative
deprivation (and high unemployment). Elsewhere, many migrants tend to  gravitate to  areas
where housing costs are relatively cheap (and housing is available), and where there are
already o thers from their home country. Thus they tend to  be concentrated in cities, and in
areas o f relative deprivation within those cities.
● There  is little  evidence  that native  workers are  harmed by migration. There is considerable
support fo r the view that migrants create new businesses and jobs and fill labour market
gaps, improving productivity and reducing inflationary pressures. Continued skill shortages in
so me areas and secto rs suggests that legal migratio n is, at present, insuffic ient to  meet
demand across a range o f skill levels.
● The  conce ntration o f migrants in particular are as brings with it a numbe r o f positive  and
negative  exte rnalitie s. Migrants bring diverse skills, experience and know-how to  the UK, and
help to  regenerate run-do wn areas; but may also  increase pressure o n ho using  markets,
transport and o ther infrastructure.
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● Migration also  has implications for the  countrie s o f origin. The migration o f skilled workers,
fo r example do cto rs o r nurses, might in so me circumstances have a negative impact o n
development and poverty reduction in poor countries, though the effects are complex and will
vary by country, by sector and over time.
● The  broade r fiscal impact o f migration is like ly to  be  positive , because o f migrants’  age
distribution and higher average wages. Again, employment is an important determinant.
● N o t e no ug h is kno wn abo ut mig rants’  so c ial o utco me s.  Mig rants bring  a  widening  o f
consumer cho ice for the host population and significant cultural and academic contributions.
They do  no t disproportionately claim benefits, although once again there is considerable
hetero geneity. As with natives, lack o f emplo yment is highly likely to  be co rrelated with
exclusion; in the case o f migrants, this may be exacerbated by, and interact with, lack o f
English language fluency and more general lack o f knowledge about UK society.
10 . Chapter 7  argues that there may be scope to  review po licy in a number o f areas:
● Migration po licy and the labour market: the different entry routes all impact on the labour
market, but in different ways, and with no real co-ordination across the different routes or with
broader objectives. Migration is important in helping to  address skill shortages at all skill levels,
and helping foster and stimulate innovation and the creation of new businesses and jobs.
● Rising illegal migration reflects a number o f factors including unmet demand in the labour
market (particularly, but not only) at the lower end, and o ther exogenous pressures (including
economic, social and po litical instability in the country o f origin). This is both unsustainable
and undesirable in eco no mic and so cial terms. W hile impro ving  co ntro l is a necessary
condition for addressing this problem, it may not be sufficient by itself.
● The entry contro l system is not sufficiently jo ined up with o ther areas o f G overnment po licy,
and post-entry po licies do  not sufficiently address social and economic objectives. There are
a number o f areas where po licy could enhance migrants'  economic and social contribution,
in line with the G overnment's overall objectives.
● Po st-entry po licies: migratio n po licy sho uld be seen as a co ntinuum, running  fro m entry
through to  settlement and to  social and economic integration.
11 . Po licies on migration should be better integrated with o ther G overnment po licies – in particular, in the
labour market and on social exclusion. Migration is neither a substitute nor an alternative fo r o ther
labour market po licies, notably those on skills, education and training; rather, migration po licies should
complement o ther po licies and contribute to  a well-functioning labour market. In do ing so , it is important
to  build on those areas o f migration po licy that are relatively successful – like the work permit system –
and address those areas that are less successful.
12 . Finally, the report briefly outlines some possible areas for further work and future po licy development.
O ptions that might be considered include:
● a thorough review o f international experiences o f the different types o f migration and the
different po licy approaches
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● better identificatio n o f migrants entering  thro ugh the different migratio n channels, their
characteristics,  mo tivatio ns and o utco mes: trying  to  explain why their o utco mes differ.  
In particular:
– better information on illegal and irregular migrants – who  they are, how they get here, 
what they do  when they get here, where they live and where they work
– b e tte r info rma tio n o n a sylum se e ke rs –  in p a rtic ula r the ir c ha ra c te ristic s 
and motivations
● a clearer understanding o f where different types o f migrants settle within the UK (by entry
ro ute and characteristics), and why; and a better understanding  o f the wider impacts o f
where migrants settle – on congestion, housing and o ther services at the local level
● more information on the social outcomes for all migrants, in particular whether and where they
suffer social exclusion and which characteristics, factors and policies can help their inclusion
● eva lua tio n o f the  impa c ts a nd implic a tio ns o f re c ent c ha ng es in mig ra tio n po lic y –
particularly the changes to  the work permit system, and the new approaches being pilo ted
● mo re  resea rc h a nd a na lysis into  the  e ffe c ts tha t mig ra tio n ha s o n so urc e  c o untries,
particularly developing countries
● a wide range o f labour market analyses – in part to  confirm the results reported in Chapter 6
and that experiences abroad (notably the US) are also  applicable in the UK. Key areas are
likely to  include:
– geographical, industrial and occupational variation in labour market (and broader 
economic) outcomes
– the impact o f English language fluency, education, and non-UK qualifications on 
labour market outcomes
– outcomes by entry route and by skills and other characteristics of the migrant (on a longer 
timeframe, it may be possible to add questions on route of entry to the Labour Force Survey)
– the interactions between illegal migration and the (formal) labour market
– impacts o f migrants on resident workers
– how these effects change over time (including potential longitudinal analyses)
● more generally, examining how the impacts o f migration vary over time, both in the labour
market and in the social and wider impacts: in particular whether these are different in the
short term and longer term.
13 All of this research and analysis will make an important contribution towards our understanding of migration
and migrants’  experiences in the UK. It will assist in identifying whether there are areas where policy should be
reviewed, helping to inform the characteristics, criteria and design of future policy development in this area.
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1 Introduction
“W e have  the  chance  in this century to  achieve  an open world, an open e conomy, and an open global
socie ty with unprecedented opportunitie s for people  and business.”
Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, Prime  Ministe r, Davos, January 2000
“At a time  o f great population movements we  must have  clear po licie s for immigration and asylum. W e  are
committed to  foste ring social inclusion and re spect for e thnic, cultural and re ligious diversity, be cause  they
make  our socie tie s strong, our e conomies more  flexible  and promote  exchange  o f ideas and knowledge .”
Communique  o f Heads o f Government,
Berlin Confe rence  on Progressive  Governance , June  2000
1 .1 As these two  statements demonstrate, there is a growing debate – in both the UK and the rest o f the 
EU – that we need a new analytical framework for thinking about migration po licy if we are to  maximise
the economic and social benefits o f migration to  the UK. This report is the work o f the Home O ffice
Economics and Resource Analysis Unit assisted by the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) o f the
Cabinet O ffice. It builds on the analysis o f the long-term drivers o f change undertaken by the PIU’s
Strategic Challenges Pro ject,1 as well as o ther work inside and outside G overnment.
1 .2 This study does not attempt to  present a statement o f G overnment po licy, either present or future. It is a
report prepared by civil servants to  help inform future po licy development. In view o f public interest in
this topic, and o f the value o f an informed and constructive debate, Ministers have taken the view that it
would be helpful for this material to  be in the public domain. 
1 .3 The impetus for this work came from a view that policy-oriented research and analysis about migration had
not kept up with developments. This omission is particularly visible and important in the context of the debate
about globalisation. W hile migration is an integral part of globalisation, many discussions of globalisation
focus exclusively on trade, investment and capital flows, and ignore the movement of people.2
1 .4 A good framework exists, bo th theoretical and po licy-oriented, for thinking about globalisation when it
comes to  trade and capital flows. That framework recognises that globalisation is both inevitable – the
UK cannot shut itself o ff from the rest o f the world – and desirable – there are significant economic gains
to  be  had.  But it a lso  reco g nises that a  pure ly la issez -fa ire  a ttitude  wo uld a lso  be  a  mistake .
G lobalisation must be managed to  maximise its helpful effects and to  mitigate its downsides. To  do  that,
G overnment needs to  take an active and progressive ro le – no t least in explaining the globalisation
process, why it is happening, why it is beneficial and what G overnment is do ing to  manage it.3
1
1 See http:/ / www.cabinet-o ffice.gov.uk/ innovation/ 2000 / Strategic/ strategic_mainpage.htm
2 Two notable exceptions are “A Future  Perfe ct: The  Challenge  and Hidden Promise  o f G lobalization” , John Micklethwait and
Adrian W o o ldridge, May 2 0 0 0 ; and “G lo balizatio n and Its Disco nte nts: Essays o n the  Ne w Mo bility o f Pe o ple  and
Money” , Saskia Sassen and Kwame Anthony Appiah, June 1999 .
3 See ,  fo r exa mple ,  the  Prime  Ministe r’s Speec h to  the  G lo b a l Ethic s Fo unda tio n,  Tüb ig en University,  G erma ny,  
30  June 2000 .
1 .5 However, that framework is not yet in place when it comes to  migration. This report aims to  help remedy
that deficiency in the UK context, by providing an analytical framework for po licy thinking on this topic.
1 .6 The analysis in this study is based o n data and research o n the UK’s current migrant po pulatio n.
Pro jections based on the current population are necessarily tentative, as future migrants may not be the
same as those who  are currently in the UK (and we know relatively little about the migrants who  are
currently here).
1 .7 This study is not intended to  be a definitive statement on UK migration. Rather it attempts to  identify what
we kno w fro m existing  data so urces and analysis, and to  o utline areas where further analysis is
required. In this way, this study aims to  be the start o f a process o f further research and debate. There is
a real need for more research in this area – indeed, it is striking how little research on migration there
has been in the UK.
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2 The economic theory of migration
The determinants of migration
2 .1 Labour mobility is much more complex, and less subject to  the currently available too ls o f economic
analysis, than capital mobility. Even very large differences in economic returns (measured by wages) are
not sufficient to  induce migration in most people. Factors o ther than the economic – including personal
ties, cultural affinities, etc. – are also  very important in the decision whether or not to  migrate.
2 .2 Simple eco no mic mo dels suggest that – in the highly unrealistic  wo rld o f perfect info rmatio n, zero
transaction costs, free movement o f factors o f production, and so  on – people would simply move to
wherever their marginal productivity was highest. Based on this underlying approach, economic models
o f migration, not surprisingly, tend to  be based around the economic incentives facing migrants.4 This is
very likely to  be inadequate. O ther factors that enter into  the migration decision are likely to  include:
● labour market conditions in both the source and destination countries
● laws and po licy in both countries
● information and information flows (which may be accurate or o therwise)
● chain migration effects (at the ethnic group, local/ village or family level)
● transport and transaction costs
● capital constraints (which may influence potential migrants’  ability to  pay transport costs)
● almo st anything  else that affects the desirability o f living / wo rking  in the destinatio n as
opposed to  source country, from ethnic or po litical vio lence to  climate.
2 .3 Given this long list, it is incorrect to see migration to the UK as entirely determined by policy, operating via the legal
and administrative mechanisms of immigration controls. There is an image, sometimes presented in the press and
public debate, of a pent-up “flood” of immigrants; if the tap is opened a little bit, more will come in, while if it is
closed a little bit, fewer will come in. As the discussion in this report shows, this is not the case. Economists’ models
of migration focus on individuals’ decisions and the incentives they face; immigration policy and immigration
controls are an influence, and a constraint, on those decisions, but not necessarily the only determining factor.
2 .4 Another conceptual trap is the view o f “ the migration decision”  as a one-o ff. In practice, people migrate
for economic, family or o ther reasons; they may initially intend to  stay temporarily and then return or
move on to  a third country, or to  settle; in any o f these cases, they may subsequently change their minds
and do  so mething  else. G lo balisatio n increases the number and co mplexity o f these flo ws: fo r this
reason, we refer wherever possible to  migration and migrants, rather than immigrants.
3
4 For general discussion o f these issues, see for example “Heaven’s Door” , Borjas (1994 ).
Does migration promote economic w elfare?
2 .5 Economic migration is normally a vo luntary market transaction between a willing buyer (whoever is
willing  to  emplo y the mig rant) and a  willing  seller (the mig rant),  and is hence likely to  be bo th
economically efficient and beneficial to  both parties. Indeed, the basic economic theory o f migration is
very similar to  that o f trade; and, like trade, migration generally is expected to  yield welfare gains. 
“As long as the marginal productivity o f labour differs in various countries, the migration o f labour is
welfare improving.” 5 If all markets are functioning well, there are no  externalities, and if we are not
co ncerned abo ut the distributio nal implicatio ns, then migratio n is we lfare -impro ving ,  no t o nly fo r
migrants, but (on average) for natives.6
2 .6 O ne key difference between migration and trade, however, is that – unlike goods or capital – migrants
are, as discussed above, economic and social agents themselves, with a degree o f contro l over the
migration decision. So  unlike goods or capital, migrants are self-selected. Partly as a result, migration is
mo st like ly to  o ccur pre cise ly whe n it is mo st like ly to  be  we lfare -e nhancing .  Co untries which are
abundant in labour will have lower wages than countries which are abundant in capital; workers will, if
labo ur is mo bile ,  have an incentive to  mig rate fro m the fo rmer to  the latter,  impro ving  reso urce
allocation overall.
Distributiona l implications
2 .7 Like trade, migration has distributional implications. In general, migration increases the supply o f labour
(and human capital); this is likely, in theory, to  reduce wages for workers competing with migrants, and
increase  returns to  capita l and o ther fac to rs co mplementary to  mig rant labo ur.  In g enera l,  this
redistribution will favour natives who  own factors o f production which are complementary to  migrants;
and hurt tho se who  o wn facto rs o f pro ductio n which are substitutes, so  a key questio n is whether
migrants’  skills are substitutes for or complement those o f native workers.
M arket fa ilures and ex terna lities
2 .8 The analysis abo ve assumes that markets are functio ning  well; in particular, that the labo ur market
matches workers to  jobs without generating unemployment. As set out in Chapter 6 , the UK does have a
relatively flexib le  and well-functio ning  labo ur market.  Ho wever,  if this is no t the case,  then it is
theoretically possible for migration to  generate higher unemployment for natives. For example, if native
workers are not prepared to  accept a wage below a given floor and migration leads to  the market wage
for some native workers falling below that floor, then migration could in theory lead to  an increase in
native unemployment. W hile overall output will not fall, output per head and output attributable to  natives
may do  so . W hether this happens in any particular case is o f course an empirical question.
2 .9 Migration may also have externalities – that is, positive or negative effects beyond those which impact on the
migrant and his or her employers directly. These might impact on the native population in a number of ways:
● congestion: migrants could increase congestion in some areas, imposing costs directly on
native workers and businesses
4
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5 Zimmermann, K., Labour Market Impact o f Immigration, in Immigration as an Economic Asse t: The  German Experience ,
IPPR, 1994 .
6 There are many different ways o f defining “natives”  and “migrants” . For consistency, the term ‘natives’  is used throughout
this report to  refer to  the existing population o f people born in the UK, to  distinguish them from foreign-born migrants.
● neig hbo urho o d benefits o r disbenefits:  mig rants co uld  he lp  to  reg enerate  depressed
neighbourhoods, or the reverse
● intangible social and human capital: migrants may have attributes – entrepreneurialism, for
example – that generate benefits for natives
● diversity: natives may gain (tangible o r intangible) benefits from interacting with migrants
from different backgrounds and cultures.
2.10 Migratio n will also  ge ne rate  co sts and be ne fits fo r G o ve rnme nt, which can be viewed as ano ther
(co llective rather than individual) form o f externality for natives:
● on the cost side, migrants will consume public services, and may be entitled to  some social
security benefits
● on the benefit side, migrants will pay taxes, both direct (if they are in work) and indirect. 
Long-run and dynamic effects
2.11 In g eneral,  co nventio nal equilibrium analysis wo uld sug g est that supply respo nses wo uld act to
mitigate the effects o f migratio n in the lo ng  run. 7 Ho wever, it is po ssible to  imag ine cases (generally
reflecting  increasing  returns to  scale) in which the lo ng -run impact o f migratio n is greater than the
sho rt-run. Fo r example, migrants might bring  with them the kno wledge/ entrepreneurial ability to
start a  new industry/ industry c luster, which then expanded to  emplo y natives and to  enco urage
natives to  start their o wn businesses in the same secto r. 8
The bottom line...
2.12 Theo ry suggests that migratio n sho uld have a po sitive effect o n gro wth, but an ambiguo us o ne o n
g ro wth per c a pita .  Ho wever,  a s with tra de ,  sta tic  estima tes o f the  ma g nitude  o f suc h e ffec ts 
are small.
2.13 It is extremely difficult to  estimate empirica lly the effect o f mig ratio n o n eco no mic  g ro wth acro ss
co untries,  fo r two  reaso ns.  First,  mig ratio n do es no t “ cause”  g ro wth: the relatio nship is likely to
run in bo th directio ns.  Seco nd, g ro wth is a ffected by numero us o ther facto rs,  and identifying  the
effect o f mig ratio n is far fro m trivia l.  There is substantia l eco no mic  literature directed at this type
o f analysis – fo r example ,  lo o king  at the effects o f educatio nal expenditure,  o r po litica l freedo m,
o n e c o no mic  g ro w th.  This lite ra ture  ha s no t te nd e d  to  lo o k a t mig ra tio n (p ro b a b ly  fo r 
data  reaso ns).
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7 For example, if immigration raises the return to  capital, investment will increase, eventually reducing the marginal return
back to  its long-run equilibrium.
8 This type o f techno logy transfer/ learning-by-do ing mechanism is similar to  that advanced in the trade literature to  argue that
trade liberalisation has dynamic as well as static economic benefits.
2.14 We have attempted to  replicate this type o f analysis for migration in European countries.9 The results
suggest that, as theory would predict, migration has had positive effects both on growth and on growth
per capita. A one per cent increase in the population through migration is associated with an increase
in G DP o f between 1 .25  and 1 .5  per cent. 
2.15 It should be  emphasised that this type  o f analysis must be  regarded as suggestive  at most. There are a
number o f complex methodo logical issues here. However, the results are reasonably consistent with
theo ry, with co mmo n sense, and with the mo re micro  level results o n migrants’  inco mes described 
in Chapter 6 .
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9 We regressed annual growth in the period 1991 -1995  on gross immigration in the same period, and G DP at the start o f the
period, for 15  European countries for which Eurostat migration data was available over a reasonably long period. To  deal
with the causality issue, gross immigration was instrumented in two  ways – the stock o f resident foreigners at the beginning
o f the time series (1981 ) and to tal gross immigration in the period 1987 -1991 . The results were similar in both cases (and
with o ther alternative specifications).
3 Key trends
History
3 .1 Britain is a country o f immigration and o f emigration. It has always been relatively open, and the British
population is now, as it always has been, the result o f successive influxes o f migrants and the racial and
cultural intermixture o f those migrants with those who  were already there.
3 .2 It is also  reaso nably c lear, if difficult to  quantify, that Britain has benefited co nsiderably, in bo th
economic and cultural terms, as a result. In retrospect, those benefits are widely accepted. Few would
dispute that the Huguenots and the Jews have made major contributions to  the British economy and
society. There is by now a welcome degree o f consensus that Britain has benefited from the post-war
immigration from the New Commonwealth.10
3 .3 The overall record is good, reflecting well both on Britain and on those who  came here. However, it is
important not to  look at the past exclusively through rose-tinted spectacles. We may pride ourselves in
retrospect on our hospitality towards Jewish refugees at the turn o f the century and during the Nazi era;
in fact, the actual record was mixed at best.
Immigration to the UK after W W II
3 .4 The o ther key po int that emerges from more recent history is that the conventional picture o f post-war
mig ratio n is an o ver-simplificatio n. The standard acco unt fo cuses o n immig rants fro m the “ N ew
Commonwealth”  (i.e., non-whites), with immigration seen as a succession o f –“waves” : first Caribbean,
then Indians, then Bang ladeshis (and perhaps no w asylum seekers). W hile at first migrants were
welco med as a valuable so urce o f labo ur, racial tensio n led to  successively tighter restrictio ns o n
immigration; by 1971  primary immigration from the New Commonwealth had largely come to  an end.
Many argued that immigration po licy had (implicitly) been “settled”  on the fo llowing lines: 
● no  more primary non-white immigration, but some family reunion
● no  major changes to  or much public discussion o f the immigration system
● no  repatriation o f migrants or their descendants
● (to  some extent) the promotion o f equal opportunity and anti-racism so  as to  facilitate the
integration o f non-white migrants (and their descendants).
3 .5 There is some truth to this, but it presents a partial and incomplete description. Immigration was primarily a
market-driven response to supply and demand, rather than a policy-driven one. Nor is the picture of mass
primary, and one-way, immigration in the 1960s and 1970s, reduced to a trickle thereafter, really accurate.
Inflows did not fall that much after 1971, and throughout the period there was substantial return migration.
7
10 The O ld Commonwealth (O C) comprises Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand; the New Commonwealth
(NC) comprises all the o ther countries o f the Commonwealth.
3 .6 Finally,  immig ratio n fro m the N ew Co mmo nwealth, while  an impo rtant demo g raphic  and so c ia l
phenomenon, is by no  means the whole story:
● there was substantial net emigration throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
● there was substantial, two-way, Irish migration 
● there has always been significant, largely uncontroversial, labour-related migration via the
work permit and o ther systems
● the UK has gradually become part o f a European labour market. 
3 .7 In each case, migration has to  varying extents been both temporary and permanent. For example, the
substantial inflows of UK citizens each year reflect in part previous emigrants returning. Likewise, net immigration
to the UK from Ireland has, more recently, turned to net emigration as return migration has increased.
3 .8 Figures 3 .1 , 3 .2  and 3 .3  use data fro m the Internatio nal Passenger Survey (IPS). This samples all
passengers entering or leaving UK airports, ports, etc – bo th visitors and migrants. The definition o f a
migrant fo r these purposes is someone who  intends to  stay fo r at least a year either in the UK (fo r
inflows) or in the destination country (for outflows).
3 .9 These Figures show that emigration from the UK has remained at similar levels to  immigration to  the UK,
for most o f the 1980s and early 1990s. In part, this reflects an ongo ing process o f outward and return
migration by British citizens. In part, it reflects return migration by foreign nationals who  had previously
immigrated to  the UK.
8

















































Figure 3 .2  Internationa l migration 1975 -98 : Tota l unadjusted outflow  by citizenship
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Recent trends 
3.10 O ver the last few years net migration to  the UK has increased significantly. This seems to  reflect the
fo llowing factors:
● economic globalisation, the most important example o f which is the success and growth o f
the City o f London. To  refresh its intellectual capital, the City requires a continual infusion o f
new talent, as well as interchange with o ther such centres like New York. G lobalisation also
reduces transport and transaction costs, making it easier for people to  move back and forth;
and it improves and increases information flows, making people more aware o f opportunities
in o ther countries
● related to  this, increasing economic integration, and in particular labour mobility, within the EU
● globalisation has also  seen increased instability in a number o f countries (both in Central and
Eastern Europe and Africa). The fall in transaction costs, making transport cheaper, enables
the establishment o f social and logistical networks that in turn allow people to  come here,
legally or o therwise
● Britain’s current relatively strong labour market (compared to  most o ther EU countries).
3.11 The rise has been in all categories o f migrants, across the board, not just in asylum seekers or work
permit ho lders.  Eco no metric  analysis (see  belo w) sho ws that it has been c lo sely co rrelated with
economic developments, both short-term (the UK labour market) and long-term (the growth in trade and
capital flows).
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Others
Accepted for settlement on arrival
Students
W P holders for 12 months or less







Family reunion and other dependents
Asylum seekers and dependents
EEA nationals for more than 12 months
Figure 3 .4  N on-British entrants to the UK, 1998 , ex cluding visitors
11 Source: Adjusted IPS data, John Salt, UCL. All o ther categories exclude EEA nationals.
All o ther fig ures are  fro m HO  admissio ns data ,  ' Co ntro l o f Immig ratio n:  Sta tistic s UK 1 9 9 8 ' ,  Ke ith Jackso n,  
Paul Harvey, INS. 
Figures exclude visitors switching into  categories o ther than asylum, and persons in the categories shown switching to  
o ther categories.
Dependents o f W P ho lders and students are included in the “Family reunion and o ther dependents”  category.
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3.12 The chart above takes the inflow o f people o ther than UK citizens, from the Home O ffice admissions
data and (for EEA nationals) the IPS, and analyses this by category o f entry – including the short term
categories those intending to  stay for less than a year (but excluding tourists and visitors). 
3.13 Some interesting conclusions flow from this analysis o f recent trends:
● asylum seekers and illegal entrants and overstayers (and, to  some extent, even family reunion
migration) are influenced by economic forces as well as po litical ones. Research shows that
where asylum seekers are in a po sitio n to  cho o se, their cho ice o f destinatio n is driven
primarily by accessibility, and by po litical facto rs, cultural, family and personal ties, and
perceived economic opportunity.12 Illegal entry – difficult to  measure, but probably increasing
– is also  likely to  be strongly correlated with economic factors
● people move in response to  economic and o ther incentives, and they will switch between
different migration categories in response to  those same incentives
● as a consequence o f the above, it would be very difficult for the G overnment to  constrain
entirely the growth in migration: trying to  eliminate migration through immigration contro l
po licy alone is likely to  be very difficult
● and most importantly, it would be counterproductive. As discussed in more detail in Chapter
6 , migration is essential to  growth in some areas. Certain regions and sectors are highly
dependent on migration. 
EU aspects
3.14 Not surprisingly – g iven the integrated nature o f the European economy - the picture fo r the rest o f
Europe is not dissimilar. Historically, the origin and flows o f migration to  o ther European countries have
depended – in addition to  po licy constraints, o f course – on the countries’  relationships with fo rmer
co lonies, recruitment for outside labour during shortages in the post-war era, and proximity to  war-torn
areas. The once-poor European countries (Ireland, Italy, G reece, Portugal and Spain) were traditionally
countries o f emigration, while the former imperial nations to  the north (Belgium, France, G ermany, The
Netherlands and the UK) received a large influx o f migrants after World W ar II.
3.15 But no w all co untries in the Euro pean Unio n have po sitive net migratio n, altho ugh the patterns o f
migration remain distinct with the sources o f immigration differing by country. Scandinavian countries,
Belgium and Luxembourg have mostly European foreign migrants. France ’s migrants have traditionally
been from North Africa since the late 1950s and early 1960s and this remains true today (64% o f
today’s immigrants are from outside the EU.) Portugal, which only recently began to  feel the impact o f
immigration (due to  its large emigrant population), has attracted many Cape Verdeans and Brazilians.
G ermany experienced the largest increase in abso lute terms, due to  waves o f immigration from Central
and Eastern Europe before G erman reunification. But despite these differences, EU countries have been
increasingly affected by common factors, such as the Bosnian and Kosovan conflicts, and the recent rise
in asylum seekers.  W ith relatively restric tive  attitudes to wards leg al eco no mic  mig ratio n, family
reunification has increased in many countries as a legal means o f entry.
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12 See European Commission report, “Asylum migration to  the EU: patterns o f origin and destination” , Anita Böcker and Tetty
Havinga (1997 ).
Future prospects
3.16 If the correlation described above continues, net migration to  the UK (and to  Europe) appears likely to
continue at a historically high level in the short to  medium term. Those migrating to  the UK are also  likely
to  continue to  be very diverse in the skills, experience and characteristics they bring, their motivation,
and their source countries.
3.17 Figure 3 .5  shows actual net migration (o f non-UK, non-EU nationals) and a simple regression-based
prediction,13 using the IPS data adjusted to  take account o f category switching and asylum seekers. 
3.18 W hile there may be some decline from the unusually high net migration levels o f the last few years, the
long-term secular trend is likely to  be increasing for at least the medium term. Moreover, we know that
higher migration flows are likely to  be persistent:14 both because migrants acquire legal rights around
family reunion, and because o f chain migration effects.15
3.19 O ver the longer term – say 5 -20  years – migration pressures seem likely to  grow:
● The decline in transaction costs driving globalisation will continue. In o ther contexts it has
been argued that this could reduce the importance o f lo cation, and hence the incentive to
move. However, this effect seems in practice to  be outweighed by the – o ften intangible –
eco no mies o f scale that o nly physical co -lo catio n can pro vide. Hence, rather than the
predicted gro wth o f telewo rking , g lo balisatio n has actually led to  the gro wth o f industry
clusters – e.g . the City and Silicon Valley.16
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13 Dependent variables are the level o f UK unemployment (ILO  basis) and net migration lagged one year. For the “prediction” ,
we assume unemployment is stable. Note that this is not a forecast; it is simply a method o f extrapo lating current trends.
14 That is, the relatively high current levels o f migration will in turn lead to  higher levels o f migration in the future than would
otherwise have occurred.
15 For example, through the spread o f information about how to  get to  a particular destination country, the entry requirements
and ho w to  find acco mmo datio n and wo rk; and thro ug h the creatio n o f a  netwo rk o f co ntacts and suppo rt in the 
destination country.
16 These trends are discussed in more detail in the Strategic Challenges pro ject paper, “The future and how to  think about it” , 
http://www.cabine t-o ffice .gov.uk/innovation/2000/Strategic/strategic_mainpage .htm
● Refugees generated by conflict have impacted on UK immigration po licy numerous times in
recent years (e.g . Uganda, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Afghanistan and Kosovo ). W hile geopo litics
is more difficult even than economics to  forecast, there are strong reasons to  believe that the
frequency o f such conflicts is likely to  increase.17
3.20 Another force that is likely to  have powerful effects over the longer term is the ageing o f the UK and
European populations (Figures 3 .6  and 3 .7  show UN census-figures based population pro jections). All
European countries have fertility rates below 3 .6  and 3 .7 , replacement levels. W ith no  net migration,
the population aged 16 -64  in the UK would fall by about two  million in the next 25  years, while the
population over 65  would rise by more than three million. This would result in the ratio  o f people aged
16  to  64  relative to  those aged over 65  (the “support ratio ” ) falling from more than four to  less than
three. This is likely to  have significant implications, including for the financing, provision and staffing o f




















Figure 3 .6  UN  popula tion indicators for the UK for scenario ll: medium variant 




























Source: United N ations Report, ‘Replacement M igra tion: Is it 
a  solution to Declining and Ageing Popula tions?’, M arch 2000 , 
table IV.18 .
17 For example, the growth in religious fundamentalism, the fragmentation o f nation states and population growth and the
contested ownership o f scarce natural resources.
3.21 The interaction o f demographic change, macroeconomic fo rces and migration is a complex one. In
particular, the projections described above do not take account of the considerable potential (especially
among those aged over 50) for higher participation rates in the labour force.18 But one way or another, the
ageing of the population will have to be addressed: presumably by some combination of these changes in
labour market activity, increases in the fertility rate, net migration, changes to the provision and financing of
public services, and increases in productivity (including increasing the skills of the labour force at large).
3.22 There is no  “right”  level o f net migration to  address demographic change, and migration is only one
(and unlikely the most important) o f a number o f measures likely to  be used to  address this problem. But
three conclusions can tentatively be drawn from these trends:
● They will increase the economic incentives to  migration, simply because, in the absence o f
migration, there is likely to  be strong upward pressure on wages (and downward pressure on
unemployment); and as we have seen, a tight labour market will draw people in.
● They will increase the economic costs o f restricting  migration because, in the absence o f
migration, labour market shortages – bo th general and sector-specific – are likely to  emerge,
putting pressure on inflation and reducing growth. The empirical economic evidence suggests
that allowing the dependency ratio  to  rise would reduce (per capita) growth.19
● Given the scale of these trends, some migration is likely to  be a desirable complement to, rather
than a substitute or an alternative for, other policy measures designed to address these issues.
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Figure 3 .7  UN  popula tion indicators for the EU for scenario ll: medium variant w ith 




























Source: United N ations Report, ‘Replacement M igra tion: Is it a  
solution to Declining and Ageing Popula tions?’, M arch 2000 , 
table IV.22 .
400000 8
18 There is considerable scope for this, even in the absence o f changes to  the formal retirement age: for example, see the PIU
report, “W inning the G eneration G ame” , May 2000 .
19 “Policy Influences on Economic G rowth in the O ECD Countries“ , O ECD Economics Department Working Paper 246 , June
2000 , Sanghoon Ahn and Phillip Hemmings.
4 Objectives of current policy
4 .1 The preceding  two  chapters attempted to  establish, primarily fro m an eco no mic  viewpo int,  why
migration is significant and what the key exogenous trends are. In the next two  chapters we examine
po licy: what are its objectives and the shape o f the current framework.
4 .2 It is important to  integrate po licies on migration with o ther G overnment po licies, in particular on the
labour market and on social exclusion, as well as wider economic and social po licies. Migration is not
an alternative to  a well-functioning labour market, and po licies on migration need to  complement those
on skills and the labour market more generally. Box 4 .1  sets out the G overnment’s high level objectives,
and key departmental objectives that can influence and are influenced by migration.
15
16
Migration: an economic and social analysis
Box  4 .1 : High level Government objectives
The G overnment’s overall objectives are:
● to  increase sustainable growth (per capita) and employment
● to  promote fairness and opportunity
● to  deliver modern and efficient public services.
Relevant departmental aims are:
● DTI: to  increase competitiveness and scientific excellence in order to  generate higher levels o f
sustainable growth and productivity in a modern economy
● DfEE: to  give everyone a chance, through education, training and work, to  realise their full
potential and thus build an inclusive and fair society and a competitive economy
● HO : to  build a safe, just and to lerant so ciety, in which the rights and respo nsibilities o f
individuals, families and communities are properly balanced, and the protection and security
o f the public is maintained
● DCMS: to  improve the quality o f life for all through sporting and cultural activities, and to
strengthen the creative industries
● HMT: to  raise the rate o f sustainable gro wth, and to  achieve rising  pro sperity, thro ugh
creating economic and employment opportunities for all
● DSS: to  encourage work for those who  can and security for those who  cannot, the modern
social security system will provide clear and enforceable gateways to  enable people to  meet
their responsibilities and take the opportunities available to  them
● FCO : to  pro mo te internatio nally the interests o f the United Kingdo m and co ntribute to  a
strong world community
● DFID: to  eliminate poverty in poorer countries.
4 .3 The Home O ffice ’s principal migration-related aim, and associated targets, are shown in Box 4 .2 .
Box  4 .2 : Home Office a ims and objectives
Home Office Aim 6 :
Regulation o f entry to  and settlement in the United Kingdom in the interests o f social stability and economic
growth; the facilitation o f travel by United Kingdom citizens; the support o f destitute asylum seekers during
consideration o f their claims; and the integration o f those accepted as refugees.
IN D Key objectives:
Controlling admissions
To contro l immigration into  the UK by identifying and denying admission when entering or attempting to  enter
in breach o f Immigratio n Rules and remo ving  them where applicable, while inco nveniencing  as little as
possible those entitled or qualified to  enter.
Asylum and a fter-entry casew ork
To determine claims for asylum and o ther in-country applications from foreign nationals wishing to  vary the
conditions attached to  their stay in the UK.
Determining citizenship
To determine applications for British citizenship.
Enforcing immigration law
To remove from the UK those here in breach o f the Immigration Rules and to  target those seeking to  profit from
abuse o f the immigration laws.
Providing asylum support
To provide support, while their applications are being determined, to  asylum seekers who  would o therwise 
be destitute.
IN D targets, under their Public Service Agreement, are process targets, and relate so lely to  
asylum seekers:
● ensure that by 2004 , 75% o f substantive asylum applications are decided within two  months
● enforce the immigration laws more effectively by removing a greater proportion o f failed
asylum seekers.
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4 .4 For comparison, Box 4 .3  shows the aims and objectives o f Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
Box  4 .3 : M ission of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)
CIC ’s mission is to  build a stronger Canada by:
● deriving maximum benefit from the global movement o f people
● protecting refugees at home and abroad
● defining membership in Canadian society
● managing access to  Canada.
The current Immigration Act has rather more specific and measurable objectives.
Economic Integration:
● to  support the development o f a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in which the
benefits o f immigration are shared across all regions o f Canada
● to  see that immigrant and refugee families are reunited (including children up to  21  years
o ld) to  support their self-sufficiency and social and economic well-being.
Social Integration:
● to  promote the successful integration o f permanent residents into  Canada, while recognising
that integration invo lves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society. 
Asylum Provision:
● to  o ffer safe haven to  perso ns with a  well-fo unded fear o f persecutio n based o n race,
religion, nationality, po litical opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as
those at risk o f torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment 
● to  grant, as a fundamental expression o f Canada ’s humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to
those who  come to  Canada claiming persecution
Crime  Reduction:
● to  pro mo te internatio nal justice and security by denying  access to  Canadian territo ry to
foreign nationals, including refugee claimants, who  are criminals or security risks.
4 .5 Thus it is clear that migration policy has both social and economic impacts, and should be designed to
contribute to the Government’s overall objectives on both counts. We now examine how the current immigration
system interacts with these other policies and objectives (in Chapter 5). Chapter 6 looks at the social and
economic outcomes of migrants that are (at least implicitly) the result of these policies and objectives.
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5 Current immigration system
5 .1 Migration po licy is a continuum, running from entry contro ls, to  settlement, to  integration. Thus, this
section examines not only entry contro l and settlement po licy, but also  reviews o ther po licies that impact
on the post-entry integration o f migrants into  UK economy and society.
The current system of control over entry and settlement
5 .2 Immigration contro l is the responsibility o f the Immigration and Nationality Department (IND) o f the
Home O ffice; the work permit system is administered by the O verseas Labour Service o f DfEE. DfEE is
also  responsible for po licy (but not the entry) o f overseas students. Entry clearance is administered by
the Home O ffice/ FCO  Jo int Entry Clearance Unit.
5 .3 At present, migrants (by which, in this context, we mean people who  are coming for longer than a short
visit) may gain entry to  the UK through the fo llowing channels:
● the work permit system
● a number o f smaller work-related categories (including the working ho lidaymaker scheme,
business persons, etc.)
● as students
● the asylum system
● the family settlement system.
5 .4 O f course, not all these migrants either wish to  or are entitled to  settle permanently in the UK. As set out
earlier, some remain for only a few months; o thers for years; and some settle permanently. O thers may
arrive initially as visitors, and subsequently decide that they would like to  stay longer, either legally or
otherwise. In addition, British citizens living abroad have unrestricted rights to  return to  and settle in the
UK. It should not be forgotten that more than 80  million people entered the UK in 1998 , primarily British
citizens returning and visitors, nearly double the figure o f a decade ago . O f these, only 0 .5  per cent
were migrants.
EEA nationals
5 .5  Nationals o f EEA member states have relatively free access to  live and work in the UK. This has long
been the case for the Irish; o ther member states have gained this right as EU single market legislation
has developed. This right is not completely unqualified: EEA nationals are supposed to  have sufficient
funds to  support themselves without recourse to  public funds, and some posts in the Civil Service are
restricted to  British citizens only.
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5 .6 The work permit system aims to  strike a balance between enabling employers to  recruit or transfer skilled
people from non-EEA member states and pro tecting job opportunities fo r resident workers. Principal
features include the fo llowing:
● employers apply for permits which are granted if the criteria are met: there are no  limits or
quotas on the number o f permits issued
● the criteria are based around jobs requiring relatively high level skills
● the employer needs to  show there is no  suitable EEA worker. But this is waived in many
circumstances, including known shortage areas, intra-company transfers, board level posts
and posts associated with inward investment
● the immigration authorities generally accept a work permit as evidence fo r a decision to
admit an overseas national to  the UK
● there is relatively little post-entry contro l on the type o f work that work permit ho lders actually
do , or on switching between jobs (especially within the same company).
5 .7 The work permit regime was subjected to  a thorough review announced in November 1999 . As a result,
a range o f measures to  streamline and simplify the system were published in the Budget, in March
2000 . A number o f these measures came in force on 2  O ctober 2000 , including changes to  the skills
thresho ld required for a work permit, and simpler procedures for extending a permit. Thus, it is now
possible for graduates to  be eligible for work permits with no  work experience for skills in high demand,
and the key worker category has been replaced with simpler procedures for workers with intermediate
skills. In addition, the maximum length o f a work permit has been increased from four to  five years, and
a number o f new appro aches will be pilo ted (including  a self-certificatio n scheme fo r multinatio nal
companies pilo ted from O ctober 2000 ).
5 .8 Around 100 ,000  work permit applications are expected this year, up from about 80 ,000  applications
in 1999  (o f which over 90% were approved). Numbers o f applications have been rising steadily since
the early 1990s. After four years, work permit ho lders have been entitled to  apply for settlement but, in
practice, a relatively small proportion appear to  settle permanently in the UK. For example in 1998 ,
3 ,160  work permit ho lders settled in the UK (although we do  not know how many settled via o ther
routes – fo r example by marrying a UK citizen).
5 .9 The dependants o f work permit ho lders are entitled to  remain in the UK during the period for which the
permit is valid, pro viding  they can be suppo rted witho ut reco urse to  public funds.2 0 They have full
entitlement to  work (if their spouse ’s work permit is for more than a year), even if the job that they then
fill would no t meet the work permit criteria. In 1 9 9 8  2 0 ,2 0 0  dependants entered with work permit
ho lders. The work permit system is discussed in more detail in Box 5 .1 .
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20 The non-recourse to  public fund provision does not preclude access to  emergency medical care.
Box  5 .1 : The w ork  permit system
The work permit system is administered by the O verseas Labour Service (O LS). The current work permit rules
were introduced in O ctober 1991 , and are in the process o f being streamlined and simplified as a result o f a
substantial review started in November 1999 . The aim o f the arrangements is “ to  strike the right balance
between enabling employers to  recruit or transfer skilled people from abroad and protecting job opportunities
for resident workers”  21
The system is employer-led. The employer applies for the work permit, a person may not generally apply for
their own permit (though the current innovators pilo t relaxes this condition). There are no  quotas, so  if an
application meets the criteria it will be approved. There is no  limit on numbers.
The aim is not to  undercut resident workers. The terms and conditions o ffered, including pay, must be no  less
favourable than those o ffered to  a resident worker do ing the same job. There are three strands in the work
permit arrangements: Business and Co mmercial, Spo rtspeo ple and Entertainers, the Training  and W o rk
Experience Scheme (TW ES).
Business and Commercial
G enerally a work permit is required where there is a labour market need. To  safeguard job opportunities for
resident workers, the employer needs to  show that the post cannot be filled by a ‘resident worker’  (usually
through advertising). This is set aside for designated shortage occupations, intra-company transfers, board
level posts and inward investment. 
The system has been based around jobs that require high level skills at a level which it would be impractical
to  train a resident wo rker. This is usually a  degree level qualificatio n o r substantial senio r managerial
experience. But o ther skills are recognised too , for example nurses and chefs.
Sportspeople  and Entertainers
There is rarely a labour market test - most people are do ing a job that only they can do . W here the employer
cannot readily show that it is a job only they can do , the O LS would seek specialist advice e.g . from Equity or
the Musicians’  Union. Separate arrangements are set up with individual sports governing bodies.
The  Training and W ork Experience  Scheme  (TW ES) 
The scheme is tightly prescribed under the Immigration Rules and is designed to  facilitate the international
transfer o f skills and expertise. Participants undertake pro fessio nal qualificatio ns and higher level wo rk
experience after which they undertake to  leave the UK to  put their new found skills into  practice. Immigration
rules prevent people transferring from a TW ES to  a work permit in all but exceptional circumstances.
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21 A ‘resident worker’  is defined as a person who  is a national o f an EEA member state o r has settled status within the
meaning o f the Immigration Act 1971 .
O ther labour-re lated categorie s
5.10 O ther entrants coming here for broadly economic reasons include:
● W o rking  ho lidaymakers.  This categ o ry is o pen to  individuals ag ed 1 7  to  2 7  fro m all
Commonwealth countries, though, in practice, the vast majority o f applicants are from the
O ld Commonwealth. They are allowed to  stay for up to  two  years, and are permitted to  work
in non-pro fessional jobs provided it is ‘ incidental to  a ho liday’ . O riginally intended as a way
for young people taking a “ trip around the world”  to  support themselves by working in bars
and restaurants, there is anecdotal evidence that many people on this scheme are actually
working in London schoo ls, NHS hospitals and the City. There is relatively little post-entry
contro l o f this group.
● The Seasonal Agricultural Workers scheme. This allows a relatively small number o f workers
(the current quota is 10 ,000  and this has just been raised to  15 ,200 ) to  enter for a period up
to  30  November o f the year in question. This category too  was originally intended primarily
to  promote cultural interchange for young people from Eastern Europe, but now is primarily
driven by the economic requirements o f agriculture.
● Commonwealth citizens with a UK-born grandparent taking or seeking employment (about
2 ,000  were granted settlement in 1999 ).
Innovators and entrepreneurs 
5.11 There are a number o f business related catego ries, including  tho se establishing  a new co mpany;
investing significant amounts; and nationals o f countries with Europe/ Association Agreements with the
EU. Relatively few (a few hundred) people enter each year under these schemes.
5.12 A new innovators scheme is currently being pilo ted, which allows entrepreneurs with innovative ideas to
enter the UK to  establish a new company, without having to  invest substantial amounts o f their own
money in the company. In addition, a new scheme for highly talented people will be pilo ted to  assess
whether there are benefits to  be gained from allowing people o f outstanding ability to  apply on their
own behalf to  enter the UK and seek work. 
Students
5.13 Students with a university place or studying in a recognised private institution are given leave to  enter,
although they can be denied entry if it is thought they intend to  remain in the UK after completing their
course (12% o f applications are refused, rising to  20 -25% from parts o f Asia and Africa). Nevertheless,
after co mpletio n they can remain o n the Training  and W o rk Experience Scheme (TW ES) o r so me
students may be eligible to  be granted a work permit on completing their course.22 In 1998 , 266 ,000
students were given leave.
5.14 Research established that immigration and work restrictions were affecting the UK’s ability to  attract
students. The Prime Minister therefore launched a three year strategy in June last year. The objective is to
attract an additional 75 ,000  HE and FE students to  the UK, to  increase the UK’s share o f the English
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22 Access to  TW ES and o ther parts o f the work permit system is currently being streamlined. Work is also  in hand to  clarify the
arrangements whereby students may apply in-country to  switch into  work permit employment.
speaking HE market from 17  per cent to  25  per cent, and to  double the number o f FE students. It was
estimated that this would increase UK exports by about £700  million. The strategy includes:
● £5  million marketing campaign with a new ‘brand ’  fo r UK education
● sponsored education fairs and exhibitions
● ministerial promotion on overseas trips
● streamlined immigration procedures to  facilitate entry and extensions
● relaxing rules for students and their spouses to  work during and after study
● increased number o f G o vernment scho larships.  £ 2 6  millio n was spent o n Chevening
sc ho la rship s,  sup p o rting  3 , 2 5 0  stud e nts in 1 9 9 7 / 8 ;  w ith furthe r inve stme nt in
complementary schemes.
5.15 The initial result was an 1 8  per cent increase in applications fo r visas to  study in the UK in 1 9 9 9 ,
increasing academic fee income by at least £100 million. Seventy-three per cent of UK higher education
institutio ns no w have an internatio nal recruitment strateg y. Po st-g raduate students are co nsidered
particularly important. DTI and British Council provide financial and practical support in recruiting abroad.
Asylum
5.16 The asylum system for refugees operates in accordance with the UK’s obligation under the 1951  UN
Convention Relating to  the Status o f Refugees and its 1967  Protoco l Convention: granting refuge in the
UK on humanitarian grounds, to  those “with a well-founded fear o f persecution” . However, large-scale
migratio n to  the UK o f asylum seekers under the Co nventio n is a relatively new pheno meno n; the
number rose from 4 ,000  in 1988  to  71 ,000  in 1999 . There is a wide spread o f source countries; the
largest include Iraq, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Turkey, former Yugoslavia and China.
5.17 The proportion o f those seeking asylum either recognised as refugees or granted leave to  enter varies
significantly according to  the mix o f applicants: from 80  per cent during the Kosovo  crisis to  15  per cent
in February o f this year. O f those refused asylum a small proportion are removed from the UK each
year, although current po licy is directed at increasing that proportion substantially. It is unclear how
many o f tho se who  are no t remo ved leave the UK vo luntarily, and ho w many remain (via ano ther
category, for example marriage).23
5.18 Research indicates that the principal motivations for asylum seekers to  come to  one EU country rather
than another, including the UK, are the fo llowing:
● accessibility, whether there are legal (or illegal) transport routes from their home country to
the EU or UK
● historical or co lonial connections
● the existence o f an established community
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23 The se  sta tistic s a re  fro m the  G o ve rnme nt Sta tistic a l Se rvic e  p ub lic a tio n:  ‘ C o ntro l o f Immig ra tio n Sta tistic s,  
United Kingdom, 1998 ’ .
● perceived economic opportunity
● the perceived relative flexibility, o r o therwise, o f the asylum determination system.24
5.19 The characteristics and mo tivatio n o f asylum seekers are impo rtant issues where further research 
is needed.
Family se ttlement system
5.20 People who  are settled in the UK have a right to  bring their dependant children and spouses to  the UK,
subject to  vario us qualifying  criteria (no n-reco urse to  public  funds, intentio n to  live to gether, etc .).
W aiting times, especially for applicants in the Indian sub-continent, can be very long: up to  a year for a
first interview. Under certain circumstances, parents, grandparents and o ther relatives can also  jo in UK
residents. In 1999 , about 65 ,000  family members settled in the UK. O f these, about 25 ,000  were the
wives o f primary settlers,  1 5 ,0 0 0  were  husbands,  2 0 ,0 0 0  were  children and 4 ,0 0 0  parents,
grandparents and o ther dependants. This represented an increase o f about 20  per cent on 1998 , which
in turn was 15  per cent up on 1997 .25
Illegal migration
5.21 In 1 9 9 8 , 1 6 ,5 0 0  illegal entrants were detected. A further 4 ,6 0 0  peo ple who  had breached their
conditions o f stay (mainly overstayers, o r working without leave) were detected. The number o f illegal
entrants detected has been on an upward trend, sharply so  since 1993 . We do  not know to  what extent
this reflects an increase in the number o f illegal entrants actually resident o r entering, o r just better
detection. However, all o ther categories o f migration were rising in this period, especially those directly
related to  economic incentives, and the upward trend in detections has been consistent (rather than
simply reflecting the step change in enforcement that took place in about 1995 ), so  it seems likely that
illegal migration was also  increasing. O f those detected, the greatest growth has been in those from
Europe, reflecting increases in irregular migration from Eastern Europe.
Policies w hich impact on integration
5.22 Virtually all areas o f G overnment, domestic, economic and social po licy affect migrants. In this section,
we highlight the key po lic ies which explic itly affect migrants and tho se that mo re implicitly affect
migrants (along with o ther elements o f the UK population). How these po licies impact on the economic
and social outcomes o f migrants is discussed in the fo llowing section.
Access to  employment
5.23 For migrants entering with work permits, o r in one o f the many o ther work related categories, such as au
pairs, employment at some level is either required or permitted. Many overseas students are now also
permitted to  work, as are those entering as spouses. Rules preclude access to  most jobs in the Civil
Service, with some exceptions for Commonwealth and EU citizens.26
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24 Böcker and Havinga (1997 ).
25 In part, but by no means entirely, this increase reflected the delayed effect of the abolition of the “primary purpose rule”  (delayed
since settlement is granted one year after entry), and so represents the one-time clearing of a backlog of potential applications.
26 This leads to some striking anomalies. For example, the non-EU national spouse of a British citizen generally cannot work as a
Civil Servant in the UK. However, the non-EU national spouse of a French citizen may.
5.24 The principal group o fficially excluded from employment is those waiting  fo r a decision on refugee
status. After six months, asylum seekers may apply for permission to  work but the uncertainty o f their
status, and the number o f mo nths o r years that they may be available to  wo rk, makes access to
employment problematic. O nce asylum seekers have attained refugee status, they are entitled to  work.
Those denied refugee status, but granted leave to  remain, are also  entitled to  work.
5.25 There is currently no  targeted pro visio n in N ew Deal fo r refugees o r tho se arriving  under family
categories. Documentation setting out entitlement to  work and services is not provided to  migrants. Nor
is induction to  the UK labour market. Some international qualifications are recognised (e.g . medicine
from South African universities), facilitating access; o thers are not.
Access to  housing, health, education and benefits
5.26 Access to  health, housing and welfare services is determined by immigration status. Entry to  the UK is,
for many migrants, dependent on evidence that they can support themselves (or be supported) without
reco urse to  public  funds. Thus, tho se subject to  immigratio n restrictio ns – fo r example, spo uses o r
accompanying children under family reunion during their first 12  months, those on work permits or au
pairs – are not entitled to  any welfare benefits or social housing. For grandparents, the restrictions on
access to  benefits and social housing remain for five years. Entitlements vary as the individual’s status
changes during  a determination process. All migrants are entitled to  emergency health care. Those
remaining more than one year may use the NHS for non-emergency cases as well. Dependant children
may attend state scho o ls. Tho se with a right o f settlement in the UK can o btain grants fo r higher
education and pay home fees.
5.27 Support for newly arriving asylum seekers with no  means o f support is the responsibility o f the Home
O ffice National Asylum Support Service (NASS). Arrangements for dispersing them to  designated areas
acro ss the co untry began in April 2 0 0 0 . The suppo rt system, which minimises cash payments and
provides a basic level o f support is intended to  reduce the perceived incentive for economic migrants to
seek asylum in the UK.27 NASS is also  intended to  provide national co -ordination o f services and relieve
local authorities o f a sometimes difficult responsibility.
5.28 Under the new dispersal arrangements, asylum seekers who  receive a final decision will have to  move
out o f their accommodation within 14  days. Those eligible for refugee status or ELR will receive advice
on access to  housing and benefits. A Home O ffice consultation paper has proposed a one-stop-shop
advice service for those granted permission to  stay.
Family reunion 
5.29 Spo uses, unmarried partners, children and o ther dependant relatives may enter the UK fo r family
reunification with principals who  are British citizens, third country nationals settled in the UK, or third
country nationals admitted in a temporary capacity (excluding visitors, working ho lidaymakers, short-
term students and au pairs). They may seek to  accompany a principal travelling to  the UK or jo in a
principal who  is already resident in the UK. Their admission is subject to  a requirement that they can
maintain and accommodate themselves without recourse to  public funds.
25
Current immigration system
27 See Home O ffice website: http:/ / www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ ind/ asylum/ asylum_home.html
5.30 The spo use and mino r children o f a  reco gnised refugee may apply fo r family reunio n in the UK.
Refugees and their families are not subject to  the maintenance and accommodation requirement set out
above. However, if a person has been granted exceptional leave to  remain in the UK, family members
will not normally qualify for family reunion until the person granted exceptional leave has completed
four years in this category. In addition, such applicants are expected to  satisfy the maintenance and
accommodation requirement.
English language  training
5.31 Migrants to  the UK are not required to  learn English and assistance fo r adults is patchy, with some
dispersed asylum seekers receiving assistance through local education authorities, and o ther provision
through adult and further education and o ther ad hoc provision. From 1967 , resources were given to
local authorities to  provide English language tuition which, until 1993 , was restricted to  Commonwealth
immigrants, but which has since been available in respect o f all ethnic minorities.28 Local authorities
have to  provide matching funding. Provision is uneven and O fsted has expressed concern about the skill
levels o f the teachers invo lved. The DfEE has earmarked an additional £1 .5  million to  support asylum-
seeking pupils in dispersal areas in 2000 -01 .
Social e xclusion
5.32 There are a range o f measures aimed at tackling social exclusion, intended to  improve the position o f all
disadvantaged groups in society – including people who  were born in the UK, migrants who  settled in
this country many years ago , as well as new migrants. These include measures to  help people back into
employment (such as the New Deal and Employment Action Zones), to  reduce crime (through the Crime
Reduction and anti-drugs strategies), to  tackle racism, and measures to  improve educational and health
outcomes (measures to  modernise the NHS and tackle health inequalities for example).29 Migrants who
fall into  “socially excluded”  groups will benefit from these measures alongside the existing population –
although their particular needs are not specifically addressed in these programmes. For refugees, the
G overnment has recently launched a new strategy for the integration o f refugees into  the UK.30
Equality 
5.33 Since the mid-1960s, the UK has had progressively stronger legislation penalising employers and service
providers who discriminate – directly or indirectly – against individuals on grounds o f ethnic origin. The
legislation, when effective, benefits the significant minority o f migrants who are not white (and indeed on
some occasions, white migrants also ). The legislation is currently being extended to  cover all public
services including  the po lice, priso ns and immigratio n service as part o f a number o f inter-related
Government initiatives aimed at achieving race equality across the public sector. These measures include:
● the development o f a race equality performance appraisal system, which was described in
the document “Race equality in public services”  published on 27  March 2000
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28 G rant was o rig ina lly pa id by the  Ho me O ffice  under sectio n 1 1  o f the  Lo ca l G o vernment Act 1 9 6 6 ,  which was
predominantly used for education but which also  extended to  o ther local authority service areas such as social services and
housing. Fo llowing the Comprehensive Spending Review in 1997 / 98 , responsibility for funding English language support
and o ther work to  raise ethnic minority pupils’  achievement, in schoo ls was transferred to  the DfEE, to  be administered as a
new Ethnic Minority Achievement G rant.
29 The So c ia l Exc lusio n Unit recently published its pro po sa ls fo r a  “ N atio nal Strateg y fo r N eig hbo urho o d Renewal:  
a  framewo rk fo r co nsultatio n”  to  integrate existing  po lic ies and develo p new appro aches to  tackle the pro blems o f 
deprived neighbourhoods.
30 ‘ Full a nd  Eq ua l C itiz e ns:  A  stra te g y fo r the  inte g ra tio n o f re fug e e s in to  the  Unite d  King do m’ ;  Ho me  O ffic e ,  
November 2000 .
● the  a nno unc e me nt in the  Q ue e n’s Spe e c h (N o ve mb e r 1 9 9 9 ) o f the  Ra c e  Re la tio ns
(Amendment) Bill which will extend the Race Relatio ns Act 1 9 7 6  to  public  functio ns no t
previously covered, such as law enforcement and immigration, and will put public authorities
under a statuto ry duty to  pro mo te race equality, as set o ut in the G o vernment’s Equality
Statement o f 30  November 1999
● the plans, as set out in the G overnment’s response in July 1999  to  the Better Regulation Task
Force report, to  harmonise, where practicable, the provisions o f the Race Relations, Sex and
Disability Discrimination Acts, and to  align the equality commissions’  powers
● the  intro d uc tio n o f ra c e  e q ua lity e mp lo yme nt ta rg e ts a s p a rt o f the  G o ve rnme nt’s
“Modernising G overnment”  white paper (March 1999 )
● the intro ductio n by the Ho me Secretary o f a  race equality g rant scheme “ Co nnecting
Co mmunities”  to  help make better links between mino rity ethnic  co mmunities and lo cal
service providers
● the establishment o f consultative fora across G overnment, such as the Home Secretary’s Race
Relations Forum and
● the development o f po licies to  address the concerns about relig ious discrimination by the
minority faith community in the light of the findings of the University of Derby research project.
5.34 Legislation to  protect minorities from racial harassment and vio lence has also  been strengthened.
Civic and cultural invo lvement
5.35 UK multi-cultural po licy recognises the value o f cultural diversity, and funding is given at national and
local level to  promote cultural activities. Groups can also  attract funding for self-help activities. It was
originally intended that young people coming for working holidays, on the seasonal worker scheme (and
presumably as students) would foster cultural exchange and return with a positive perception o f Britain.
However, in relation to  those on working visits there are no  po licies directed at ensuring that this happens
in practice. Little is known about the extent to  which longer term residents participate in civic society.
Citizenship (nationality) po licy
5.36 The G overnment believes that encouraging citizenship will help to  strengthen good race and community
relations and that ‘one measure o f the integration o f immigrants into  British society is the ease with
which they can acquire citizenship' .3 1 Migrants and refugees witho ut restrictio ns can apply fo r UK
citizenship after five years residence. There is an application fee o f £120 -150 . W hile few obstacles are
put in their way, there is no  po licy to  encourage applications, o ther than to  try to  reduce the waiting
time for a decision to  12  months. There is no  ceremony. The significance o f citizenship status is primarily
access to  a British passport and the ability to  pass the nationality down to  their children. However, it
also  entitles individuals to  vote in local, national and European elections, and provides greater access to
employment in the Civil Service.
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Access to  vo ting and candidature
5.37 British citizens can be candidates for and can vote in local and national elections, and elections for the
European Parliament. Citizens o f Commonwealth countries can vo te in lo cal and national elections.
Euro pean Unio n citizens can vo te in lo cal electio ns and tho se fo r the Euro pean Parliament. O ther
immigrants and refugees cannot vote nor be candidates for election.
Legal flexibility to  accommodate  cultural/re ligious customs
5.38 The UK has been relatively flexible in allowing changes to  the law that enable religious minorities to
maintain and abide by their customs. This includes, enabling them to  ho ld marriages and funerals in the
manner required by their relig io n and, fo r example, allo wing  Sikhs to  wear turbans instead o f the
otherwise compulsory crash helmet on motor bikes. O ther groups do  not benefit from this flexibility. It is
not known what impact such rules have on migrants’  attitudes to  residence here.
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6 The economic and socia l 
outcomes of migration
6 .1 Having described the current po licy framework, we now proceed to  examine outcomes. These outcomes
likely vary for the different categories o f entry, reflecting the diverse characteristics o f migrants and the
different requirements and restrictions associated with the different categories.
6 .2 The impacts o f migration are broad and varied across the economic and social spheres – with
significant overlap and interaction between the two . Analyses o ften seek to  measure ‘benefits'  and
'costs' . But it would be a mistake to  define either too  narrowly, or to  attribute either impact to  the
migrants alone.
6 .3 This section examines the various aspects o f migration to  the UK, looking at the outcomes that result from
current po licies. W here possible, we provide comparisons about the characteristics and impacts o f
migrants in o ther European nations, with the recognition that social and economic systems differ
throughout Europe.
6 .4 In all o f the fo llowing, there is much that we do  not know for the UK and for o ther countries. Migrants
are a small part o f many datasets and are difficult to  identify with precision in these sources. There is a
real need for further work to  better identify the different groups o f migrants and their characteristics and
to  understand the reasons for their different outcomes.
6 .5 The definition o f what is a migrant differs across datasets. The International Passenger Survey (IPS) takes
all those who  intend to  stay for more than a year, while we have used country o f birth in the Labour
Force Survey (LFS) as using nationality would exclude migrants who  have since settled in the UK.
Migrants are not the same as ethnic minorities. The majority o f migrants are white, and the majority o f
ethnic minorities are not migrants as they were born in the UK.
6 .6 The data pick up primarily legal migrants, but illegal migrants are likely to  be included to  varying
degrees. In particular, those who  overstay the duration o f their visa and those who  work beyond the
terms o f their visa are quite likely to  remain within the formal sector in o ther respects. W hile it is likely
that some surveys may include at least some o f these groups, there is a real need for better information
on those who  enter or remain in the country illegally.
Characteristics of migrants
6 .7 Migrants are very heterogeneous – differing across many dimensions, and differing at least as much
from each o ther as they do  from the population at large. In particular, migrant experiences are more
po larised than those for the population as a whole, with larger concentrations at the extremes (e.g . o f
wealth and poverty, high and low skills, etc.). 
6 .8 The Eurostat inflow data (below) shows there is no  principal source country o f migration to  the UK. The
largest single identifiable group is UK nationals (mostly returning emigrants, though some are born
abroad). O ther major sources are the EEA and Asia, but there are significant numbers o f migrants from
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every region o f the world. This pattern o f sources is noticeably different from the rest o f the EU. The
pattern o f inflows also  differs from the stock o f migrants living in the UK – in part reflecting the different
typical durations for different groups.
6 .9 Turning  to  LFS data, educatio n and skill levels are po larised within the migrant po pulatio n: that is,
proportionately, there are both more highly educated people, and more relatively unskilled. To  some
extent, this po larisation reflects the functioning o f the immigration system – those allowed into  the UK on
work permits and as students will be relatively highly educated (almost by definition). Migrants entering
through o ther routes will tend to  have a more diverse range o f skills – bo th because o f their various
reasons for migrating and because o f the diverse education systems they come from – qualifications
from which may not all be recognised in the UK.
6.10 This po larisatio n between high and lo w-skilled migratio n appears to  be a general Euro pean-wide
phenomenon, suggesting that it reflects general economic and market trends more than country-specific
po licies.32 And while many asylum seekers and illegal immigrants probably do  not show up in these
statistics, o ther research sho ws they to o  are very hetero geneo us, with a  significant pro po rtio n o f
pro fessionals.33
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Figure 6 .1  Inflow  of migrants 
    to the UK by citizenship
EUROSTAT 1997









Figure 6 .2  Inflow  of migrants 










32 See Metropo lis paper 99 -S3 , ‘Experience with Temporary Workers: Some Evidence from Selected European Countries’ ,
Thomas Straubhaar (1998 ).
33 The Settlement o f Refugees in Britain, Home O ffice Research Study No .141  (1995 ).
6.11 There are also  characteristics that migrants will have in co mmo n. In particular, the self-selectio n o f
migrants is likely to  mean that they are more resourceful, entrepreneurial and ambitious than the norm. It
is mo re difficult to  measure these qualities, bo th because o f the mo re general data pro blems, and
because some are simply not measurable.
M igrants’ labour market outcomes
6.12 Migrants have mixed success in the labour market: some migrants are very successful, but o thers are
unemployed or inactive. At least in part, labour market success is influenced by the category o f entry to
the UK, bo th thro ugh the requirements and restrictio ns placed o n different catego ries o f entry, and
through the targeting  o f characteristics likely to  generate success (in particular fo r the various work
permit ca teg o ries).  O vera ll the ir wag es are  hig her,  but this averag e  masks the  po larisa tio n o f
experiences, with migrants concentrated at both the top and the bottom o f the income distribution, and
with lower activity rates than natives. Education and English language fluency are key determinants o f
labour market success and interact in complex ways.
Labour marke t participation
6.13 O verall migrants are less likely to  be employed and more likely to  be unemployed than natives (on LFS
data). In addition, migrants are half as likely again as natives to  be inactive, probably partly reflecting
lower participation rates amongst women, and partly reflecting the numbers o f students. Again, there is
considerable heterogeneity in migrant experiences and some groups o f migrants have particularly high
unemployment and inactivity rates, while o thers have high employment rates.
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Qua lifica tion Categories
Key to 
Qualifica tion Levels
1-Degree level and above
2- Other higher education
3-NVQ level 3, A-level or
equivalent
4-NVQ level 2-3, GCSE
or equivalent
5-Other qualification




6.14 The catego ry o f entry and the requirements, restrictio ns and targeting  may generate these varying
labour market experiences. Language fluency is also  an important determinant o f employment. Recent
studies3 4 show that the employment rate fo r ethnic minority migrants is 2 0  to  2 5  percentage po ints
higher when they are fluent in English. In addition country o f o rig in may be closely correlated with
outcomes because o f cultural and historical links that may ease integration.
6.15 Levels o f entrepreneurship and self-employment also  appear to  be high among migrants (and higher
among migrants in the UK than those elsewhere in Europe).35 For example, it has been estimated that
150 ,000  French entrepreneurs have moved to  the UK since 1995 36 (attracted in part by better transport
links thro ugh the Channel Tunnel). These have included Internet and o ther high-tech ventures, o ne
example cited was a computer design firm that had relocated to  Ashford, Kent.37
6.16 Migrants appear to  perform well in the UK labour market compared to  other EU countries (although cross-
country comparisons need to  be treated with care, given data problems). The migrant population in the
UK has an unemployment rate o f six per cent compared with an unemployment rate o f just under five per
cent for the UK born. In France, non-EU migrants face a 31 .4  per cent unemployment rate, compared to
11 .1% for the French. Nearly half o f migrants under the age o f 26  are unemployed, twice the rate o f
French nationals in the same age group.38 Similarly, migrants are twice as likely to  be unemployed as
natives in Denmark, three times as likely in Finland, and four times as likely in The Netherlands.39
W ages and incomes
6.17 O n average, those migrants identified in the Labour Force Survey who do  work earn rather more (12% on
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34 Shields and W heatley Price (1999 ) found a 20  - 25  percentage po int effect, using data from the fourth National Survey on
Ethnic Minorities (NSEM, see Modood et al., 1997 ); and Dustmann and Fabbri (2000 ) found an effect o f around 15
percentage po ints for ethnic minorities more generally using the same data, and an effect o f around 20  percentage po ints
using the Family and Working Lives Survey (FW LS).
35 See Business Week, “Europe ’s Unsung Heroes” , 28  February, 2000 . And, for example, immigrants are twice as likely to
own businesses in Denmark as natives (15% against 7%) – reported by FCO  post.
36 “French Firms flee Jospin for Britain” , Charles Bremner, The Times, 22  February 2000 .
37 “Internet fosters a G allic invasion” , Charles Bremner, The Times, 22  February 2000 .
38 FCO  report France.






































average) than natives, but this conceals considerable variance in incomes. In particular, migrants appear
to  be significantly over-represented at the very top o f the income distribution (reflecting those with very
high wages), and are also  highly concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution (reflecting their
higher unemployment rates and lower participation rates). Many o f the relatively well-paid migrants likely
reflect the success o f the work permit system in matching migrants to  vacancies in skilled occupations.
Returns to  skills and education
6.18 For those that are in work, UK research has shown that language fluency increases the mean hourly
occupational wage for ethnic minority migrant men by around 17  per cent.40 This result is corroborated
by similar experiences in o ther countries, e.g . in Canada and in The Netherlands.41
6.19 W hen a separate effect is iso lated fo r English language fluency, migrants appear to  receive similar
returns to  education to  those found for the UK more generally:
Table 6 .1 : Returns to sk ills and education
Percentages UK males (LFS analysis Ethnic minority migrant men
from Dearden, 1999) (Shields and W heatley Price,
1999)
Return on O  levels relative to  no  qualifications 22 16 1⁄2*
Return on A levels relative to  only O  levels 10 1⁄2 9
Return on a degree relative to  only A levels 15 1⁄2 17
* O  levels and fluent in English against no  qualifications and not fluent
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Figure 6 .5  Gross w eek ly pay
Natives
Migrants
Wage category (£ / w k)
40 Michael A. Shields and Stephen W heatley Price, ‘The English language fluency and occupational success o f ethnic minority
immigrant men living in English metropo litan areas’ , 1999  – using the NSEM dataset.
41 The most reliable data on migrant success and language skills is from Canada. See also  Peter Kee and Hans van O phem,
“ Immigrant W ages in The Netherlands: the Ro le o f Dutch Language Proficiency,”  in Migrants in the  European Labour Marke t
by Saziye  Gazioglu.
6.20 However, o ther studies have found that migrants’  qualifications are undervalued in the labour market.
Bell (1997 ) and Shields and W heatley Price (2000 ) both find that male migrants receive a lower return
per year o f education than natives, and that education abroad is valued less than education in UK
(using the G HS and LFS respectively). Part o f this result may reflect the effect o f English language fluency
(which is not identified separately in these studies), but part is likely to  reflect low levels o f recognition o f
foreign qualifications and possibly discrimination.
Migrants’  labour marke t outcomes over time
6.21 There is a substantial literature in the US showing that immigrants generally begin by earning less than
natives, but catch up and eventually o vertake them – kno wn as the “ assimilatio n hypo thesis” .  UK
research had suggested that such overtaking did not generally occur for migrants to  the UK.42 However,
recent research using National Insurance data suggests that UK migrants do  appear to  replicate the US
pattern and to  overtake native earnings after a certain period in the UK43 (see Figure 6 .6 ) though those
migrants who  remain in the UK are inevitably a relatively narrow subset o f the to tal.
6.22 In addition, a similar pattern o f labour market assimilation can also  be seen in the economic activity
data. Migrant activity rates increase with time after arrival in the UK, but remain lower than for natives –
though lower female participation (reflecting cultural factors as well as skills or opportunities) and the
high proportion o f students account for at least part o f this. This pattern o f assimilation suggests that
there may be short term difficulties for migrants, as well as longer term benefits, as a result o f migration.
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42 Chiswick (1980 ) and Bell (1997 ), though the data set for each is relatively small.
43 HM Treasury, unpublished research note.
O ther barrie rs to  employment
6.23 Supply-side barriers also  contribute to  migrants’  lower labour force participation rates. Discrimination is
pervasive in EU labour markets; few governments o ther than the UK have anti-discrimination legislation
pro tecting  ethnic o r racial minorities, let alone migrants.4 4 Many EU employers are reluctant to  hire
refugees because o f lack o f knowledge about refugee issues and fear o f cultural incompatibility.45
Box  6 .1 : Refugee Doctors46
The BMA News Review says “Britain is squandering the talents o f people who  want nothing more than to  get
back into  medicine at a time o f national shortage o f doctors” . It estimates there are 1 ,000  doctors in this
position in the London area, many o f whom are do ing unskilled casual jobs. There are criticisms that the
language test doctors are required to  pass is o f a higher standard than expected from graduates from UK
medical schoo ls, and there is little support or guidance to  refugees on how to  retrieve their medical career. An
exception is a two  year course at Hendon Co llege to  prepare doctors for the language test and refresh their
medical skills. 
Dr Nayeem Amim came from Afghanistan in 1993 , heard about the Hendon course in the local paper and is
now a G P Registrar in Dunstable, Bedfordshire. “This country saved me and now I have a chance to  give
something in return”  he says.
Dr Mo hammed Ibrahim arrived in Britain fro m So malia in 1 9 9 4 . He wo rked as a security o fficer while
studying English, supporting a wife and six children. “I didn’t know my way through the medical system, there
was no  real suppo rt available and I didn’t kno w whether my qualificatio ns wo uld be acceptable” .  His
housing trust then sponsored him to  do  an MSc in epidemio logy which he completed in 1997 . He then heard
about the Hendon course and is now studying for the language tests.
6.24 These difficulties are most marked for refugees: a survey o f 236  qualified and skilled refugees in London
in 1999 , who  were entitled to  work, found that 42  per cent o f those with refugee status and 68  per cent
o f the asylum seekers were unemployed.47 Similarly, a 1995  Home O ffice study found that only 27  per
cent o f refugees were employed, while 36  per cent were unemployed. This is likely to  reflect difficulties
in accessing English language training,48 and a lack o f knowledge o f the UK job market;49 as well as
more general barriers to  employment. These barriers were summarised by the Audit Commission in a
recent report.50
35
The economic and social outcomes of migration
44 In June 2000 , the Council o f Ministers agreed on a directive prohibiting racial and thnic discrimination in the workplace.
45 Refugee Council, ECRE Task Force on Integration, Refugees and Employment: the  European Context, November 1999 .
46 BMA News Review 29  April 2000
47 Peabody Trust/ London Research Centre Refugee  skills-ne t, the  employment and training o f skilled and qualified re fugees.
June 1999
48 The Audit Commission has reported ESO L classes as heavily oversubscribed, with several authorities having waiting lists o f
over 200  people.
49 Duke, A, 1 9 9 7 , ‘ The resettlement experiences o f refugees in the UK, main findings fro m an interview study’ ,  N e w
Co mmunity, 2 2 (3 ); fo und that tho se who  have participated in G o vernment training  schemes were mo re successful in
obtaining jobs.
50 Audit commission, 2000 , Another Country: Implementing dispersal under the  Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 .
The concentra tion of migrants: sectora lly and geographica lly
6.25 O verall, migrants have little aggregate effect on native wages or employment, though they can have
more o f an effect (positive and negative) on different sub-groups o f natives. Those migrants who  are in
work tend to  be concentrated in employment sectors where there are unfilled vacancies. At the same
time, migrants are also  residentially co ncentrated in areas o f high unemplo yment and deprivatio n.
Continued skill shortages in some areas suggests that legal migration is, at present, insufficient to  meet
demand. Migrants’  impacts on congestion and o ther externalities, like impacts on housing markets, can
be both positive and negative, but not enough is known about them.
Labour marke t impact on native s
6.26 As set out in Chapter 2 , trade theory suggests that mobility o f factors o f production reduces returns to
the factor that is imported, and increases returns to  o ther factors. So  high-skilled migrants, for example,
should reduce wages for the high-skilled labour (as high-skilled labour is now more plentiful) and
increase returns to  capital and low-skilled workers (if, as seems likely theoretically and empirically, high-
skilled workers are complements for low-skilled workers).
6.27 Many econometric studies, mostly in the US but also  in Europe, have examined the relationship between
proportions o f migrants and wages, employment and unemployment rates by region or sector – taking
account o f the difficult causality issues. Most such studie s find little  or no  e ffe ct on the  wages or
employment prospects o f native s, certainly not at an aggregate level – even if there is a large, rapid
influx o f migrants into  a particular location.51 As one recent survey o f the literature concluded:
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Racism: racial discrimination may hinder people
from getting employment
Work  ex perience: lack of work experience and a resulting lack
of references in the UK may be a disincentive for employers
Re-accredita tion: qualifications from abroad may not be recognised
in the UK, requiring people to requalify locally
N ationa l Insurance (N I) numbers: employers may ask for N I numbers
Asylum seekers may have problems obtaining them
Documentation checks: asylum seekers'  papers may say that they are subject to 
detention and may not say that they have the right to work
Gender: usually, only principal asylum applicants are granted the right to work. This may
exclude many women from the workplace
Paperw ork : asylum seekers must seek permission to work from the IND or have restrictions removed
from their documentation
Status: for the first six months, asylum seekers are nomally not entitled to work
Language barriers: many arrivals speak little or no english. English spoken in other countries may have local differences
EM PLOYM EN T
Figure 6 .7  The cumulative barriers to employment
Source: p76, Audit Commision (2000)
51 The classic study in this field is Card (1990 ), which looks at the effect o f the Mariel boatlift, a huge and exogenous influx o f
migrants to  the Miami area. Borjas (1994 ) surveys the economic literature, finding no  support for the hypothesis that the
employment opportunities o f US-born workers are strongly and adversely affected by immigration.
“The  overwhe lming majority o f empirical studie s agree  that there  is e ssentially no  statistically significant
e ffe ct o f immigration on labour marke t outcomes” 52
6.28 The  e ffec t o f immig ra tio n may be  mo re  pro no unced fo r spec ific  sec tio ns o f the  eco no my and
population.5 3 Much clearly depends on the economic and social environment; the speed, scale and
concentration o f migration; the particular characteristics o f the migrant and native populations; and the
extent to  which migrants complement, or are in competition with, natives. In addition, it is possible that
more recent migrants may be substitutes fo r previous migrants, as they are likely to  move to  similar
locations in the UK, have similar skills and work in similar industries.
6.29 There is relatively little work in this area in the UK: what exists is consistent with the US evidence. G ang
and Rivera-Batiz (1994 ) estimate that a one per cent increase in migrant labour will have very small
effects on native wages, between +0 .02  per cent and –0 .08  per cent.54 Zorlu (2000 ), basing his work
on ethnic minority data rather than on immigrants, also  finds that bo th substitution and competition
effects are occurring simultaneously, so  that there is no  clear unambiguous effect on wages overall. Zorlu
also  finds that ethnic minority workers do  not compete with each o ther in the labour market, both when
disaggregated by skills and when disaggregated by ethnic origin.
6.30 It is perhaps not surprising that immigration has no  measurable impact on unemployment in the US and
UK. The “ lump o f labour”  fallacy – that there are only a fixed number o f jobs to  go  round – has been
tho ro ug hly d isc re d ite d ,  a nd  it is inc re a sing ly re c o g nise d  tha t,  g ive n so und  ma c ro e c o no mic
management, unemployment is primarily a structural phenomenon. If that is the case, then migrants will
have no  effect on the job prospects o f natives; and the appropriate po licies for G overnment to  pursue to
address unemployment among natives (and, to  the extent relevant, among past and present migrants)
are those o f education and training designed to  connect people with the labour market. This o f course is
precisely what the G overnment is do ing with the New Deal and o ther po licies. 
6.31 Ho wever,  the  well-established lack o f e ffec t o f mig ratio n o n wag es has lo ng  been reg arded as
something o f a paradox. It seems intuitive that immigration must depress wages (at least o f those whose
skills are comparable/ substitutable with those o f migrants), even if it generates growth overall. O ne
possible explanation for this lack o f effect, which appears to  be empirically supported, is that migration
affects no t wag es, but the co mpo sitio n o f o utput (that is,  the industria l structure o f the receiving
country).53 Thus migration o f workers into  a particular sector allows that sector to  expand, leaving wages
and employment o f the existing workforce (in that and o ther sectors) unchanged. So  if migration o f
workers in a particular sector is restricted – say the IT sector – then it will not primarily be the case that
the supply o f, and wages o f, native British IT workers will increase. The IT industry will simply shrink
relative to  what would have happened with a less restrictive po licy.
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52 G aston and Nelson, July 2000 .
53 For example, in Canada, Akbari and De Voretz (1992 ) conclude that no  significant displacement o f native workers, by
either o ld or new immigrants, o ccurs overall, but that displacement is significant in labour-intensive sub-sectors.
54 Ira N. G ang and Francisco  L. Rivera-Batiz (1994 ), ‘Labour market effects o f immigration in the United States and Europe:
substitution vs. complementarity’
55 See “ The Emplo yment and W ag e Effects o f Immig ratio n” ,  N o el G asto n and Do ug  N elso n, Centre fo r Research o n
G lobalisation and Labour Markets, University o f Nottingham, July 2000 .
Sectoral concentration o f migrants
6.32 Economy-wide skills shortages are significant, though they remain below the levels seen in the late
1 9 8 0 s. The fact that many migrants are concentrated in the industries and secto rs where there are
particular labour or skill shortages is clear both anecdotally and from the available data:
● Health: 31  per cent o f doctors and 13  per cent o f nurses are non-UK born; in London 23  per
cent and 47  per cent respectively. Half the expansion o f the NHS over the last decade – that
is, 8 ,000  o f the additional 16 ,000  staff – had qualified abroad. A Royal Co llege o f Nursing
survey reported 78  per cent o f hospitals with medium to  high recruitment difficulties. 
● Educatio n:  O verseas teachers play an impo rtant ro le in staffing  scho o ls in Lo ndo n. 5 6 A
growing number o f London education authorities are recruiting staff directly from abroad to
address staff shortages in schoo ls. Recent research commissioned by the Schoo l Teachers
Review Body (STRB) suggests that schoo ls in England and W ales will have to  find an extra
10 ,000  teachers over the next four years.57
● Highe r e ducatio n: In 1 9 9 5 -9 6 , the Higher Educatio n Statistics Agency sho wed that no n-
British nationals made up 12 .5  per cent o f academic and research staff, were most likely to
be in medicine, science and engineering, and comprised over half the faculty o f LSE. 
● IT: The increase in demand for specialist IT skills has been spectacular, and is expected to
continue. Pro jections suggest that the IT services industry alone will need to  recruit another
540 ,000  people between 1998  and 2009 .58
● Catering : An estimated 70  per cent o f catering jobs in London are filled by migrants yet, at
the same time, 4 0  per cent o f ho spita lity firms repo rted recruitment difficulties earlier 
in 2000 .59
● Agricultural labour: There is significant excess demand for the Seasonal Agricultural Worker
scheme, which is currently limited to  10 ,000  places per year (the quota has recently been
revised upwards to  15 ,200 ).
6.33 It is important, however, to  distinguish between the different reasons why migrants are concentrated in
these sectors:
● In health and education, wages are constrained by po licy, and there are relatively clear
procedures for recognising foreign credentials. Migration in these sectors, therefore, benefits
the  pub lic  se c to r – a nd  he nc e  the  g e ne ra l pub lic ,  a s ta xpa ye rs a nd  c o nsume rs o f 
public services.
● In IT a nd  o the r priva te  se c to r pro fe ssio ns e xpe rie nc ing  skill sho rta g e s,  wa g e s a re
unco nstrained. But supply is co nstrained by lags in training  natives. In the absence o f
migration, firms would bid up wages and after a lag, supply would respond. But the relative
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56 According to  Timeplan (one o f the country’s largest teacher recruitment agencies), “W ithout overseas teachers, schoo ls in
Lo nd o n w o uld  b e  fa lling  a p a rt”  –  fro m “ C a sh o ffe r to  re c ruit te a c he rs”  BBC  N e w s,  4  A ug ust 2 0 0 0 ,  URL:
http:/ / news6 .thedo .bbc.co .uk.
57 ‘Schoo ls face severe teacher shortage ’ , BBC News, 11  August 2000 ,URL: http:/ / news6 .thedo .bbc.co .uk
58 Institute o f Employment Research, University o f W arwick.
59 ‘Struggle to  put jobs on the menu’ , Evening Standard, 28  February 2000 .
flexibility o f the work permit system allows firms to  import migrants. Migration in these sectors
may in theory reduce the wages o f qualified natives (but only relative to  what would be a
temporary increase over the long-run equilibrium) and benefit firms, although as noted above
there is little well-established evidence o f this theo retical effect in practice. W hile, in the
absence o f o ther incentives and po licy measures, it may also  in theory reduce the incentives
for natives to  acquire skills, in practice any effect is likely to  be minimised by the fact that
wages are already likely to  be above long-run equilibrium in the relevant sectors.
● In relatively lo w paid and insecure secto rs like catering  and do mestic services, unskilled
natives are simply unwilling or unable, through lack o f the most basic work-related skills (or a
lack o f mobility), to  take the large number o f available jobs. The effect o f migration in these
se c to rs is a g a in to  b e ne fit firms,  b ut it is no t like ly tha t na tive s a re  sig nific a ntly
disadvantaged: if migrants do  not fill these jobs, they simply go  unfilled or uncreated in the
first place.
6.33 In all three cases there is a net economic benefit to  the UK from filling the gaps through migration. The
result o f migration is to  reduce inflationary pressures and increase the efficiency o f firms.
Regional and local impacts o f migration
6.34 Migrants are highly co ncentrated – and increasing ly so  – in Lo ndo n. No t o nly do  o ver half o f all
migrants live in London and the South-East, but more than two-thirds o f new migrants are settling there.
There is co nsiderable anecdo tal evidence that this is bo th generated by and generating  the recent
economic and cultural resurgence o f London. W here migrants settle is likely to  be a complex decision
(and will likely vary for the different routes o f entry). It is also  very significant for o ther economic and
social outcomes, and needs much more consideration.
6.35 London is the UK’s largest labour market, accounting for around 15  per cent o f all jobs. In addition, the
well-documented unmet labour demand in London will attract migrants (and may be a condition for their
entry, if they enter on work permits) and London is a global city with a widely recognised name, image
and reputation. W ithin London, there are indications that migrants are also  concentrated in areas o f
bo th re la tive  pro sperity and re la tive  deprivatio n (and hig h unemplo yment) and have  po larised
experiences. Migrants are disproportionately represented in both Kensington and Tower Hamlets. 
6.36 More generally, many migrants are likely to  gravitate to  areas where housing costs are relatively cheap
(and housing is available), and where there are already o ther people from their home country. O utside
London, data on ethnic minorities suggests that migrants will tend to  be concentrated in cities, and in
areas o f relative deprivation within those cities. For example, around 60  per cent o f Birmingham’s ethnic
minority population can be found in seven o f the city’s 39  wards. 
6.37 Migration to  the UK is unlikely to  be completely independent of internal migration within the UK. There is
some evidence60 to  suggest that the causal linkage runs both ways. Migrants took jobs in the South-East in
the mid-1980s that could in theory have been filled by native migrants from the North, though this was only
one of many factors limiting north-south migration. At the same time, the process of counter-urbanisation is
likely to  have increased the number of migrants living in inner cities, as they have occupied (social) housing
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60 Champion, Fotheringham, Rees, Boyle and Stillwell (1998 ), The  De te rminants o f Migration Flows in England: A Review o f
Existing Data and Evidence , DETR.
that had been released as natives moved out. Similarly the US literature has tended to  find that inflows of
recent migrants have little effect on the locational decisions of native workers.61
6.38 So me have arg ued 6 2 the expansio n o f co rpo rate headquarters, internatio nal finance and related
activities in g lo bal cities has led to  the creatio n o f bo th well-paid pro fessio nal jo bs and lo w wage
service jobs such as cleaners, caterers and domestic help. Migrants are attracted to  such cities to  fill jobs
at both ends o f the spectrum, and to  supply services through small businesses (various shops and taxis),
including in deprived communities.
6.39 O the rs6 3 ha ve  a rg ue d  tha t whe n mig ra nts a re  c luste re d  in po o re r ho using  e sta te s w ith hig h
unemployment, it can be difficult to  escape these conditions and to  integrate into  the wider community.
So  while at least some cities o ffer considerable opportunity, it is not certain that migrants will be in a
position to  take advantage o f that opportunity.
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61 David Card (1 9 9 6 ), “ Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the lo cal labour market impacts o f higher immigration” ,
Working Paper 368 , Princeton University.
62 For example, Saskia Sassen (1991 ), The  global city: New York, London, Tokyo , Princeton University Press.
63 For example, C. Peach (1995 ), Does Britain have  ghe ttos? , O xford University Press.
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UK average – 7.5%
Percentage
M igrants as a  share of the popula tion
W ider exte rnality e ffe cts
6.40 The relative concentration o f migrants in particular areas means that they can contribute to  a number o f
externalities. For example, they can, in theory, increase the pressure on housing markets, transport and
other infrastructure, and exacerbate over crowding, congestion and pressures on scarce green belt land
(e.g . in the South-East). Equally they can bring skills, experience and know-how with wider benefits to
the UK, and help to  regenerate run-down areas. 
6.41 Similar to  the assimilation seen in the labour market, many of these pressures reflect the fact that existing
infrastructures are unable to  adapt quickly eno ugh to  large changes in a lo cal po pulatio n. This is
particularly marked when those new entrants to  the area have new and particular needs and characteristics
– for example, a lack of fluency in English, or different cultures and religions. Thus while there may, in
theo ry, be negative (as well as po sitive) externalities asso ciated with migratio n, these o ften reflect
transitional and adjustment costs that can be managed through effective migration and integration policies.
6.42 It is not clear that migration has, in practice, increased congestion and over crowding in London. The
population of London has increased at the same rate as the UK population overall over the last 20  years, at
a time when other major cities in the UK have been shrinking, causing problems of under-use, neglect and
decay. That migration has helped to  prevent this counter-urbanisation in London, and helped to  regenerate
otherwise run-down areas, suggests that the impact o f migration can be both subtle and ambiguous.64
Table 6.2: Change in UK population
UK population (1000s) 1981 1997 % change
London 6 ,802 7 ,122 +4 .7
Birmingham 1,079 1 ,014 -0 .6
Liverpoo l 517 464 -10 .3
Manchester 463 428 -7 .6
20  largest cities in UK 14 ,569 14 ,743 +1 .2
UK 56,360 59,009 +4.7
Source: O ffice for National Statistics
6.43 The concentration of migrants in specific locations can also generate social effects, for example through the
competition for jobs and resources in local markets. There is at least anecdotal evidence that high concentrations
of migrant children lacking English as a first language can lead to pressure on schools which lack sufficient
resources to  meet levels o f need, and to  some concern among other parents. These effects have been
recognised recently, both by increased funding from DfEE for schools taking on the children of asylum seekers,
and by the fact that children recently arrived from overseas who have difficulties with English will not be
included in the figures for school performance league tables.65 Hospitals and health services may, in theory, also
come under particular pressure, and tension may also centre on access to social housing (where migrants are
eligible), although the focus of debate has been on ethnic minorities, not necessarily migrants. These concerns
and tensions are likely to be most pronounced if there is a sudden large influx of migrants into a particular area.
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64 Similar regenerative effects can be seen in US cities that are primary migrant destinations, such as New York and Los
Angeles, which have performed well relative to  o ther US cities that have seen lower immigration and falling populations.
65 “Performance tables to  take asylum seekers/ refugees into  account” , DfEE Press Notice 338 / 00 , 20  July 2000 .
Impact o f emigration 
6.44 As set o ut in Chapter 3 , the UK experiences substantial o utflo ws o f emigrants each year, in part
reflecting the temporary nature o f some o f the migration to  the UK, in part reflecting emigration o f UK
nationals. The more these emigrants keep in touch the more likely this emigration (in particular where it
is o f skilled workers) is to  be beneficial to  the UK. They will fo rm networks, trade and investment links,
and potentially return with improved skills etc. in due course.
6.45 Migration, especially o f skilled workers, can also  have an important impact on the countries o f origin:
particularly develo ping  co untries. The po tential effects o n develo ping  co untries are diverse, with
potential benefits and costs to  the countries o f origin. In the long term, migration o f skilled labour may
have costs for the country o f origin, by inducing a switch to  products and processes that require less
skilled labour, and by causing a deterioration in the public services and public administration. At the
same time, longer term benefits may include the new skills and dynamism brought back to  the country o f
origin by returning migrants. Even if migrants do  not return, migration may help to  develop international
networks that promote trade and investment flows, benefiting both source and receiving countries. O ne
example o f this is the mutually beneficial relationship between the Indian so ftware industry in Bangalore
and Silicon Valley, which is characterised by a very large Indian migrant workforce.
6.46 This is a complex area and there is a serious shortage o f consistent and continuous data on skill and
qualification categories o f migrants from the developing world and the impact o f their emigration. The
net effect o f migration will vary over time and from source country to  source country depending on the
skills o f migrants, the sectors they leave, and whether they subsequently return.
Fisca l effects
6.47 The broader fiscal impact o f migration is likely to  be positive, because o f migrants’  favourable age
distribution (a greater proportion o f migrants are o f working age), and the fact that migrants in work
have higher average wages than natives. Likewise the fiscal impact is likely to  be more beneficial to  the
extent that migrants are working as opposed to  not working, working legally rather than illegally, and
making full use o f their skills and experience.
6.48 Migrants have a direct impact on G overnment expenditure and revenue by paying  taxes, claiming
benefits (where entitled) and consuming G overnment-provided goods and services. They also  generate
indirect fiscal effects through macroeconomic and labour market impacts that alter the level, and growth,
o f G DP, and the returns to , and employment o f, native labour and capital.
6.49 Broadly speaking, over the life cycle, natives are a net fiscal burden while they are in compulsory (state-
financed) education; net fiscal contributors when they are in employment; and net burdens again when
they are unemplo yed, retired and when they require expensive medical services. It seems highly
probable that this pattern is broadly similar for migrants although, since the UK does not incur the same
costs for educating first-generation migrants as it does for natives it is likely that, overall, migrants and
natives will have different fiscal impacts. The age profile and labour market outcomes o f migrants, as
described above, therefore suggest they are likely to  make some net fiscal contribution – particularly
since during the period in which they are most likely to  be unemployed, immediately after arrival, they
may be ineligible for unemployment benefits.
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6.50 A recent US study found that migrants pay on average $80,000 more in taxes than they receive over their
lifetime66 (under certain assumptions about taxation). A study on the fiscal impact of foreigners in West Germany
indicated that this group contributed more to the economy than they received in transfer benefits.67 Similarly, an
initial analysis for the UK suggests that migrants contribute more in taxes and National Insurance than they
consume in benefits and other public services. We estimate that the foreign-born population contributes around
10 per cent more to Government revenues than they receive in Government expenditure, equivalent to perhaps
£2.6 billion in 1998/ 99 (this is the mean of a wide range of values, and varies substantially depending on the
assumptions used – although it is positive under all reasonable assumptions). Put another way, if there were no
foreign-born people in the UK, taxes (or borrowing) would have to rise, or expenditure would have to be cut, by
£2.6 billion (the equivalent of about 1 pence on the basic rate of income tax).
6.51 These results provide a one-o ff snapshot o f the fiscal impact o f the current cross-section o f migrants, and
are sensitive to  the underlying assumptions. In particular the current population o f migrants is in part the
product o f past migration po licies, and may not be representative o f potential future migrants to  the UK. In
addition the aggregate results reported mask the different impacts o f different migrants. However, this
analysis is reasonably clear that, on average and overall, migrants are  not a burden on the  public purse . 
Use/consumption o f benefits
6.52 The foreign-born population claims the majority of social security benefits at or about the same rate as natives,
according to LFS data. Migrants are more likely to be in receipt of unemployment and housing benefits, but
less likely to be receiving sickness or disability benefits, or a state pension. To some extent, the relative use of
benefits reflects different eligibility rules for different types of migrants, particularly recent arrivals.
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66 James P.  Smith and Barry Edmo nsto n (Eds. ),  The  N e w Ame ricans:  e co no mic ,  de mo g raphic ,  and fiscal e ffe c ts o f 
immigration, 1997 .

















































6.53 Not enough is known about migrants’  social outcomes. There are no  data on many key outcomes and the
data which does exist fails to  distinguish between short and long term impact, which might be expected to
differ significantly. It is also  difficult to  distinguish between possible macro  benefits (or costs) to  society as
a whole and micro  costs (or benefits) to  individuals, households and firms, and little work has been done
to  identify whether the impact could have been enhanced, or avoided, by po licy intervention.
6.54 Benefits include a widening o f consumer cho ice and significant cultural contributions (e.g. in the arts,
literature, science and sport); these in turn feed back into  wider economic benefits. Social impacts can be
real, without being quantifiable. We cannot measure the impact that Yehudi Menuhin (as an immigrant)
had on those who heard his music or were taught by him: but he clearly had an impact. Some impacts can
be quantified, for example increases in consumer choice, but many other contributions cannot. 
6.55 Mig rants’  experience  o f so c ia l exc lusio n canno t be  measured. Ho wever,  as fo r natives,  lack o f
e mp lo yme nt is a  ke y c a use  o f w id e r so c ia l e xc lusio n.  The  d a ta  sho w  tha t mig ra nts d o  no t
disproportionately claim benefits. 
Consumer cho ice
6.56 Increased travel and migration has clearly benefited consumer cho ice. There has for example been a
dramatic expansion in restaurants providing cuisine from across the world (including Indian, Chinese,
Turkish, G reek and Thai), and o f a range o f fresh and pre-packed fo o ds which were unkno wn to
consumers less than two  decades ago . 
6.57 Total sales in ethnic food in 1994  were valued at about £736  million, representing an extraordinary
change in British eating habits. In 1996 , there were 10 ,000  curry houses in Britain with 60 ,000  to
70 ,000  employees and a turnover o f £1 .5  billion – more than the steel, coal and shipbuilding industries
put together.68 The market in ethnic food for home cooking was in 1996  worth £129  million a year.69
Education
6.58 Migration has introduced greater diversity into  UK schoo ls in a variety o f ways – more diverse pupils,
teachers, and experiences and interests fo r study. The UK is the second largest receiving country o f
foreign students after the US, with 17  per cent o f the English-speaking to tal. In 1995 / 6  international
students studying in public sector institutions in the UK contributed £600  million in fees. International
students enrich the cultural and intellectual environment o f a university and its lo cality, stimulate new
curriculum appro aches and fo ster understanding  between cultures. Chapter 5  describes the recent
moves by the G overnment to  attract more foreign students to  the UK. A number o f the world ’s po litical
leaders were educated in the UK including, most recently, the new President o f Syria. The importance o f
this for the UK’s relationship with the rest o f the world should not be under-estimated.
O ther contributions
6.59 Migrants have undoubtedly made significant positive contributions in social and cultural fields, and to
public life. Some o f the most public contributions to  Britain have been in sport, art, music, publishing,
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fashion, architecture, dance and theatre. British art and cultural expression are a fusion, out o f which
has grown significant UK export industries from food and fashion to  music. Many winners o f the Booker
literary prize over the last 30  years have been first or second generation immigrants – notably Kazuo
Ishiguro , Salman Rushdie, Timothy Mo, Michael O ndaatje and Michael Ignatieff. Similarly, three o f the
four artists short listed for the 2000  Turner prize were born outside the UK. Nicho las Serota (director o f
the Tate) commented, “ I think it' s a question o f recognising that culture here is much richer than we could
define by those who  have simply been born in this country” .70
6.60 Migrants are particularly well represented in academia, education and medicine. Some outstanding
examples o f success include Sir Magdi Yacoub, a cardio -thoracic surgeon, originally from Egypt, who
pioneered heart and lung transplants in Britain; and Dr. A. Karim Admani, o riginally from India (and
awarded an O BE in 1986 ), who  set up Britain’s first stroke unit in Sheffield in 1975 . And, historically,
migrants who  arrived as refugees have been among those who  have had the most impact on UK society
and the economy – in particular, the Huguenots, the Jews and the Ugandan Asians, who  played a
leading ro le in the development o f the UK’s domestic and global financial markets.
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70 The diverse contribution made by immigrants and refugees is described in the comprehensive account published by the
CRE, Roots o f the  Future , Ethnic Diversity in the  Making o f Britain. 1996
Box  6 .2 : Citizenship
Acquisition o f citizenship is considered an index o f integration. Although po licy does not actively encourage
applications, they have grown at an average annual rate o f 11  per cent (1992 -97 ). But it is not known how
many foreign residents who  are entitled to  apply for British citizenship actually do  so : 
● o f those entitled to  apply and still in the UK, Home O ffice records (in 1997 ) showed 35  per
cent o f a random sample had applied 
● o f those who  could be tracked down for interview, 58  per cent had applied for citizenship –
the vast majority successfully. Most non-applicants believed they would do  so  at some stage 
● those married to  a UK citizen were twice as likely to  have applied 
● 29  per cent were deterred by the long period o f waiting for their application to  be processed
(then 13  months) 
● 37  per cent o f non-applicants said they would apply if the cost were lower 
● 44% of them did not know how to  apply, and 14  per cent did not know that they were eligible 
● there was no  fear o f refusal.71
A ‘strong attachment’  to  the UK was also  significant in deciding to  apply. Those from developed countries
were less likely to  apply, as were those whose country o f origin did not permit dual nationality, and those who
did  no t need visas fo r trave lling  abro ad.  Altho ug h c itiz enship  co nfers the  rig ht to  vo te  (except fo r
Commonwealth citizens who  already can), research found that 60  per cent o f those who  had applied for
citizenship in order to  be able to  vote, had not yet voted.
Research abroad suggests that the majority o f migrants given permanent residence do  eventually become
citizens. Expectations o f returning ‘home ’  at some stage, prohibitions on dual nationality, and cost, all inhibit
applications. W ithin the EU, migrants who  identify most with their host country are those who  have taken out
citizenship o r dual natio nality: 7 0  per cent identified ‘entirely o r a lo t’ ,  whereas under 2 0  per cent o f
temporary residents did.72
In the UK the process o f applying for citizenship is not at present marked as a significant event either for the
applicant or fo r their new country. It is at best low key, at worst a frustrating exercise in bureaucracy. In
contrast, the Canadian citizenship ceremonies mark an important step in the integration process, held as a
celebratio n. The o ccasio n serves as a symbo lic reminder o f the o bligatio ns and privileges o f Canadian
Citizenship. A specially designed “ Citizenship O ath”  pledg ing  is administered by a  c itizenship judge
appo inted by the G overnment, and fo llowed by a welcome reception. The Home Secretary has suggested
that similar ceremonies might be considered in the UK.
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72 Enid W istrich, David Smith, Tunc Aybak, The  Migrants Voice  in Europe , Middlesex University, 2000 .
6.61 Leaving aside the economic implications, whether the changes that have resulted from migration are a
“benefit”  is clearly subjective. However, most British people do  regard it as such; social research shows
that the majority consistently regards immigration as having a positive effect on British culture.73 This is
true even for many o f those who  favour a more restrictive attitude to  immigration contro ls.
Social e xclusion
6.62 Failure to integrate migrants into UK society and to allow them access to public services can lead to their being
socially excluded in other respects, which can, in turn, cause personal and social problems. In part, social
exclusion can be the result of entry and settlement controls designed to deter entry. Access to employment, health,
housing and welfare services is determined by immigration status, as most of those subject to immigration
restrictions are required to live without recourse to public funds (with the exception of emergency healthcare).
6.63 Lack o f English is a further determinant o f exclusion, disadvantaging migrants in the labour market and
in accessing health and o ther services. Thirty nine per cent o f refugees cite the lack o f English as a
barrier to  their successful settlement, and 25 -30  per cent arrive with little or no  English.74 Those arriving
under family categories may equally experience difficulties.
6.64 Migrants’  lack o f recognised qualifications can also  cause difficulties in obtaining employment. Lack o f
documentation clarifying  entitlement similarly leads to  denial o f services – including access to  child
benefit, housing benefit and NHS treatment.75 Lack o f documentation also  inhibits access to  essential
private services (e.g . opening a bank account and connecting to  utilities).
6.65 The outcome is difficult to  measure. There is little data specifically for migrants on such indexes o f social
exclusio n as health, victimisatio n, invo lvement in crime o r pro po rtio n o f children in care. W here
disaggregated data does exist, as on mortality, averages can mask large disparities within the migrant
population, and these problems are o ften most acute fo r the most vulnerable – asylum seekers and
refugees – as the Audit Commission76 recently reported.
6.66 Between 1995 and 1999, around a third of asylum seekers obtained permission to stay in the UK and, in
practice, a higher proportion remain (for example, through marriage). The long term impact of good or poor
reception arrangements on subsequent social exclusion is therefore significant. A Home O ffice consultation paper
has recognised the need to assist in the transfer from asylum to settled status: “There is a weight of evidence that
refugees find difficulties in making the transition from support to independence and fulfilling their potential for
development and contributions to society. … there is a need to invest early in integration to promote a quick move
from dependency to self-value and sufficiency through work and inclusion in community and society”.77
6 .67  Public attitudes to  migrants in the UK are similar on average to  those across Europe.78 There is no  data
on the extent to  which migrants suffer harassment or abuse, although it can be assumed that non-white
migrants figure within the higher levels o f victimisation among ethnic minorities. Thirteen per cent o f
refugees in one study considered racism and discrimination a barrier to  their successful settlement.79 As
noted earlier, lo cal concentrations o f migrants can cause tensions around schoo ls and social housing.
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74 Bloch, A, (2000) ‘Refugee settlement in Britain: the impact o f po licy on participation’ , Journal o f Ethnic and Migration Studies,
vol 26 , No 1 , 75 -88 , January 2000 ; The  Se ttlement o f Re fugees in Britain, 1995 , Home O ffice Research Study 141 .
75 A person before  the  law: the  CAB case  for a statement of rights for people  with limited leave  in the  UK. NACAB February 2000.
76 Another country, implementing dispersal under the  Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 , June  2000 . Audit Commission.
77 A consultation paper on the  integration o f re cognised re fugees in the  UK, Home O ffice, O ctober 1999 .
78 Various Eurobarometers, on Europa web site.
79 Bloch (2000 ).
7 Possible future policy development
7 .1 Chapters 4  and 5  o f this research study set o ut the G o vernment’s aims and o bjectives go verning
migration po licy, and the range o f entry contro l, settlement and integration po licies which are currently
in place. Chapter 6  went on to  consider what we know about the economic and social impacts o f these
po licies. This chapter considers, on the basis o f this analysis, where there is scope for further developing
the aims, objectives and po licies for migration in order to  make them more consistent and to  enable
migration to  better serve the G overnment’s broader high level objectives.
7 .2 First, it should be made clear that aspects o f the system function relatively well in a number o f respects. In
practice, it permits a substantial amount o f economic migration, largely to  meet labour market demand.
The so cial and eco no mic o utco mes partly reflect the way in which present and past po licies have
operated and have been generally positive – both for many individual migrants and for the UK as a
whole. We should not lose sight o f this. However, migration po licy as a whole is not jo ined-up, and is not
closely related to  its stated objectives, either economic or social. This has likely contributed to  the varied
and po larised experiences o f migrants in the UK. There is considerable scope for better co -ordination
across the different aspects o f migration po licy, and between migration and other po licy areas.
7 .3 There are four broad areas where migration po licy could be better focussed on achieving its aims and
objectives (and could contribute more to  high level objectives):
● migration and the labour market – bo th encouraging entrepreneurs and new businesses to
come to  the UK, and addressing skill shortage at all skill levels
● illegal migratio n – co nsidering  a  bro ader range o f po licy measures to  sto p the rise in
irregular migration
● e ntry  c o ntro l –  b e tte r inte g ra tio n w ith o b je c tive s fo r mig ra tio n a nd  w ith o the r 
broader objectives
● post-entry po licies – to  make the link between the decision to  allow migrants to  enter the UK
and their economic and social outcomes.
7 .4 A key message o f the analysis and assessment is that we know relatively little about migration – in
particular, the characteristics and motivations o f different migrants and their (likely differing) economic
and social impacts and experiences. Thus while the fo llowing does highlight a number o f areas where
there is scope to  consider and review po licy, it also  identifies the key areas where further research and
analysis is required. Much o f the economic analysis is based on a small number o f studies and o ften
relatively small datasets, and far less is known with any confidence on the social side. There is a real
need for more research and analysis on the social and economic aspects o f migration in the UK. There
is also  much that can be learnt from experiences from other countries, while being aware o f the different
circumstances that they face.
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7 .5 The analysis and assessment in this paper suggests a number o f areas where po licy could be developed
– supported by further research and analysis – to  help improve performance o f the migration system.
Migration and the  labour marke t
7 .6 Different entry ro utes all impact o n the labo ur market, but in different ways, and with no  real co -
ordination across the different routes or with broader objectives. There are ongo ing problems with skill
shortages at all skill levels which migration is meeting in part, and migration also  benefits innovation
and entrepreneurialism, creating new jobs.
7 .7 A number o f refo rms have been introduced (o r are being  pilo ted) to  make it easier fo r innovators,
entrepreneurs and highly talented people to  enter the UK. However, the broader climate for innovation
and new businesses in the UK will also  be an important factor in attracting entrepreneurs, as will the
wider social and cultural environment. The UK has had some successes in attracting entrepreneurs from
elsewhere in the EEA, but there may be merit in considering why they chose the UK, why more do  not
choose the UK and where the barriers are (given the absence o f migration po licy obstacles). 
7 .8 O n skill sho rtages, there is c learly unsatisfied demand at all skill levels in the labo ur market. The
G overnment is implementing measures to  reform the labour market, including providing more training
o ppo rtunities and enhancing  skills in o rder to  intro duce greater flexibility, whilst at the same time
ensuring  minimum standards are met. Migratio n po licy can be useful as an additio nal instrument,
although it is not a substitute for a well-functioning labour market and effective po licies on skills and
training. Skill shortages and unfilled vacancies manifest themselves at all skill levels:
● Attracting  hig h skilled mig rants is a  g ro wing  pro blem. There is increasing  co mpetitio n
between destination countries for “ the brightest and the best”  and a limited supply. W hile
entry contro ls have a part to  play, the wider opportunities and characteristics o f the UK are
also  likely to  be significant.
● Recent reforms to  the work permit system have included a downward revision o f the high skill
thresho ld making entry easier for some migrants who  would not have been eligible for entry
under the previo us rules. Experience o f this develo pment will help to  info rm analysis o f
whether this change will meet demand for skills at this level. 
● Allowing entry o f low-skilled workers on a small scale has been relatively successful in filling
vacancies in some sectors (notably in agriculture, through the seasonal agricultural workers
scheme). There may be scope to  extend this treatment to  o ther sectors, either where the unmet
labour demand is seasonal or temporary, or more generally.
7 .9 In each case, many aspects o f migration po licy and subsequent po licies on integration are possible
instruments. For example, attracting more EEA nationals, helping those granted asylum or entering as
dependents or through family unification to  better use their abilities in the labour market, o r reviewing
existing work related categories.
50
Migration: an economic and social analysis
Illegal migration
7.10 Illegal migration has occurred for a number o f reasons. In part because there is unmet demand in the
labour market (particularly, but not only) at the lower end, and in part because o f o ther exogenous
pressures (including civil war, and economic, social and po litical instability). W hile improving contro l is
a necessary condition for addressing this problem, it is unlikely to  be sufficient. We need to  examine the
interaction o f legal and illegal migration and its impact on different areas o f the labour market. 
Entry contro l
7.11 The current entry contro l system is not sufficiently jo ined up with o ther areas o f G overnment po licy, and
post-entry po licies do  not address social and economic objectives. In addition, there are a number o f
areas where  po licy co uld enhance mig rants’  eco no mic  and so c ia l co ntributio n,  in line  with the
G overnment’s overall objectives, but is failing to  do  so  :
● Aim 6  relates primarily to  entry contro l, rather than to  post-entry po licies (except in the case
o f asylum seekers) yet the latter are at least as important in determining migrants’  contribution
– positive or negative – to  society. Migrant settlement is a two-way process, depending both
on the willingness and ability o f the migrant to  adapt and integrate, and on the extent to
which the host society provides access to  economic, social and po litical life. Significantly,
neither the debate on social exclusion, nor the indexes used to  measure it, have hitherto
embraced migrants as a category to  be considered.80
● The Home O ffice has a separate commitment to  promote race  equality, particularly in the
provision o f public services such as education, health, law and order, housing and lo cal
government. This is a specific PSA objective under Home O ffice Aim 5  (Helping to  build,
under a modernised constitution, a fair and prosperous society, in which everyone has a
stake, and in which the rights and responsibilities o f individuals, families and communities
are properly balanced). The focus o f this objective is on the minority ethnic population (which
encompasses around half o f the migrant population) but, like the social exclusion debate, has
not so  far explicitly recognised migrants as a separate group, facing specific problems.
● W hile the Home O ffice has responsibility fo r immigration contro l po licy, migration has a
wide range o f impacts with relevance across G overnment, not only to  the Home O ffice. Most
notably, DfEE, via the O LS, is responsible for the primary channel o f economic migration, the
work permit system. But DfEE has no  economic targets or objectives for O LS. DfEE also  has
responsibility for increasing the number o f overseas students; but it is Home O ffice Rules that
regulate their entry.
● It is o ften implied that there is a trade-o ff between economic growth and social stability, with
more o f one implying less o f another. In fact, the analysis reported in Chapter 6  suggests that
the two  o ften go  hand in hand: an economically beneficial migration po licy will also  have
positive social impact, and vice versa.
7.12 This suggests that Aim 6  needs to  be developed over time, and made more operational, to  reflect better
the overall objectives o f the G overnment, and the ro le o f o ther Departments.
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7.13 O ne possibility for future consideration might be a cross-cutting PSA reflecting the broader objectives o f
the range o f departments with an interest in migration, in particular, as well as the Home O ffice, the
DfEE, the DTI, DSS, the FCO  and DfID. Such a PSA would reflect the G overnment’s overall objectives
and the co ntributio n that mig ratio n po licy mig ht make. This appro ach has wo rked well in o ther 
po licy areas.
Box  7 .1 : Possible PSA for migration policy
Aim: to  promote sustainable growth and a stable, secure and to lerant society
O bjectives might be:
● to  regulate admission and settlement to  the UK in the interests o f sustainable growth and
inclusion in a safe, just and to lerant society
● to  enable and encourage legal migrants to  the UK to  make the greatest possible contribution to
sustainable growth and competitiveness
● to  ensure migrants fulfil their responsibilities and are fairly treated 
● to  promote the successful inclusion o f legal migrants into  society. 
Post-entry po licie s
7.14 Migration po licy should be seen as a continuum, running from entry through to  settlement and to  social
and eco no mic integratio n. At the mo ment, mo st migrants cease to  be regarded as an appro priate
subject fo r po licy once they pass entry contro l. Exceptions are where they either break the rules, in
which case they are subject to  enfo rcement actio n, o r they are no n-white, in which case they are
regarded as part o f the broader ethnic minority agenda. 
7.15 Post-entry migration po licy has a potentially powerful ro le in influencing migrants’  economic and social
outcomes and their economic and social impacts on natives. Thus there appears considerable scope for
more substantive and co -ordinated post-entry po licies designed to  ensure that migration does indeed
achieve the G overnment’s economic and social objectives.
W here is further w ork  needed to inform any review ?
7.16 Any such po licy review would need to  take account o f the complex interactions between migration
po licies and o ther po licies. For example, those on education and training for the existing population;
po licies aimed at getting  the unemplo yed back to  wo rk and increasing  participatio n rates fo r the
inactive; and specific po licies aimed at improving the social inclusion o f o ther disadvantaged groups in
the UK. In additio n, future po licy develo pment wo uld need better info rmatio n abo ut the impacts o f
current po licies and the potential impacts o f any po licy changes – notably on congestion, impacts on
public services, and impacts on source countries (particularly developing countries).
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7.17 There are a number o f areas where further research and analysis would contribute to  the debate: 
● a more thorough review o f international experiences, o f the different types o f migration and
the different po licy approaches
● better identificatio n o f migrants entering  thro ugh the different migratio n channels, their
characteristics,  mo tivatio ns and o utco mes: trying  to  explain why their o utco mes differ.  
In particular: 
– better information on illegal and irregular migrants – who  they are, how they get here, what
they do  when they get here, where they live and where they work
– better information on asylum seekers – in particular their characteristics and motivations
● a clearer understanding o f where different types o f migrants settle within the UK (by entry
route and characteristics), and why. A better understanding o f the wider impacts o f where
migrants settle – on congestion, housing and o ther services at the local level
● more information on the social outcomes for all migrants, including ways o f measuring their
contribution to  UK society, and in particular whether and where they suffer social exclusion
and which characteristics, factors and po licies can help their inclusion
● eva lua tio n o f the  impa c ts a nd implic a tio ns o f re c ent c ha ng es in mig ra tio n po lic y –
particularly the changes to  the work permit system, and the new approaches being pilo ted
● mo re  resea rc h a nd a na lysis into  the  e ffe c ts tha t mig ra tio n ha s o n so urc e  c o untries,
particularly developing countries
● a wide range o f labour market analyses – in part to  validate the results reported in Chapter 6
and that experiences abroad (notably the US) are also  applicable in the UK. Key areas are
likely to  include:
– g eo g ra phic a l,  industria l a nd  o c c upa tio na l va ria tio n in la b o ur ma rket (a nd  b ro a der 
economic) outcomes
– the impact o f Eng lish language fluency, educatio n and no n-UK qualificatio ns o n labo ur
market outcomes
– outcomes by entry route and type o f migrant (on a longer timeframe, it may be possible to
add questions on route o f entry to  the LFS)
– impacts o f migrants on resident workers
– how these effects change over time (including potential longitudinal analyses)
● more generally, examining how the impacts o f migration vary over time, both in the labour
market and in the social and wider impacts: in particular whether these are different in the
short term and longer term.
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7.18 All o f this research and analysis will make an important contribution to  our understanding o f migration
and migrants’  experiences and impacts in the UK. It will assist in identifying whether there are areas
where po licy should be reviewed, helping to  inform the characteristics, criteria and design o f any future
po licy development in this area.
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Appendix  1 List of consultees
In the course o f the pro ject, the team held two  workshops, on the social and economic impacts o f migration.
We are very grateful to  the fo llowing people for their valuable contributions at these workshops.
Workshop on Economic Impact of M igration (15  M ay 2000) 
Suma Chakrabarti Cabinet O ffice
Martin Donnelly Cabinet O ffice
Robert W halley Home O ffice
G raeme Hopkins Home O ffice
Julie Fry HM Treasury
Jitinder Kohli PIU
John Salt University Co llege London
Timothy Hatton University o f Essex
Tony Fielding University o f Sussex
Julia O nslow-Cole CMS Cameron McKenna
Thomas Hadley Confederation o f British Industry
G avin Mensah Coker DEMO S
Susie Symes The Spitalfields Centre
Workshop on Socia l Impact of M igration (15  June 2000)
Sarah Marshall Home O ffice Race Equality Unit 
Faz Hakim No 10  Po litical Unit
Norman G lass HMT/ National Institute for Social Research
Mike Keoghan DETR
Kamini G odhok Department o f Health
Peter W ard Home O ffice
Tim Woodhouse Home O ffice IND
Tariq Modood Bristo l University
Mark Johnson De Montfort University
Enid W istrich Middlesex University
Ian Preston UCL 
Zig Layton-Henry W arwick University
Rushanara Ali IPPR
Richard Dunstan NACAB 
Sandy Buchan Refugee Action
Dick W illiams Refugee Council
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In addition, the team met and corresponded with numerous o thers with interest or expertise in the subject,
inside and outside G overnment. These are listed below. We are grateful fo r their time and assistance; o f
course, they have no  responsibility fo r the opinions expressed in this report, o r fo r any factual errors o r
omissions. We apo logise to  anyone who  has inadvertently been omitted. 
Des Storer G overnment o f Australia
Nico l MacDonald G overnment o f Canada
Sonia Bhatia Citizenship and Immigration, G overnment o f Canada (CIC)
Dan Costello CIC
G eorge Sullivan CIC
Meyer Berstein Metropo lis Pro ject, CIC
Howard Duncan Metropo lis Pro ject, CIC
Bob Bach Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), US G overnment
Thomas Hussey Immigration Litigation O ffice, INS, US G overnment
Scott Busby US State Department
Alan Krescko  US State Department
Richard Berthoud Essex University
Stephen W heatley-Price Leicester University
Mark Shields Leicester University
Raquel Fernandez London Schoo l o f Economics and Po litical Science
Marion Fitzgerald London Schoo l o f Economics and Po litical Science
Christian Dustmann University Co llege London 
Khalid Koser University Co llege London 
John Salt University Co llege London 
G ordon Hanson University o f Michegan
David Co leman University o f O xford
Randall Hansen University o f O xford
Alan Ryan University o f O xford
Steven Vertovec University o f O xford
Diane Coyle The Independent
Elspeth G uild Kingsley Napley
Reyahn King Birmingham Museums and Art G alleries 
Kathleen Newland Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Demetrios Papademitriou Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Clive Saville UK O verseas Students Association
The team also  met and corresponded with a number o f o fficials from the Cabinet O ffice, Department fo r
Education and Employment, Department o f International Development, Department o f Trade and Industry,
Fo reign and Co mmo nwealth O ffice, HM Treasury, the Ho me O ffice, 1 0  Do wning  Street, and the Bank 
o f England. 
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benefit? ’ , 2000
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Economic Journal, 107 , pp333 -344 .
“Subsitutability o f Foreign Born Labour in Canadian Production: circa 1980 ”  in Canadian Journal o f
Economics Vo l 25  August 1992  pp 604 -14 .
Card, David ‘The Impact o f the Mariet Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, ’  Ind. Lab. Rel. Rev., Jan. 1990 ,
43 (2 ), pp. 245 -57
David Card (1996 ), “ Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local labour market impacts o f higher
immigration” , Working Paper 368 , Princeton University
Chiswick, B.R. (1980 ), “The earnings o f white and co loured male immigrants in Britain” , Economica, 47 ,
pp81 -87 . 
G aston and Nelson, “The Employment and W age Effects o f Immigration: Trade and Labour Economics
Perspectives,”  conference working paper, 2000 .
Migrants in the European Labour Market by Saziye G azioglu
Policy Influences on Economic G rowth in the O ECD Countries, O ECD Economics Department Working Paper
246 , June 2000 , Sanghoon Ahn and Phillip Hemmings.
Carnegie Endow ment for Internationa l Peace 
Klusmeyer, ‘Between Consent and Descent: Conceptions o f democratic citizenship, ’  1996
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